Russia’s dilemma in post-Assad Syria: can Moscow maintain its presence?

A Russian delegation has made its first official visit to Syria since the fall of President Bashar al-Assad. This visit follows a major setback for Moscow: the new authorities in Damascus have cancelled a 49-year lease agreement that had secured Russia’s military presence in Syria. The deal, originally established when Russia and the Assad government were allies in a war against Syrian opposition forces, is now void. The Russian Foreign Ministry said the visit came at a "crunch point" in Russia-Syria relations, while Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov called it an "important trip".

"It is necessary to build and maintain a permanent dialogue with the Syrian authorities, which is what we will continue to do," Peskov told reporters.

The Russian delegation was led by deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov, who is also Vladimir Putin's special envoy on the Middle East and Africa and met with Syria's new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Moscow, desperate to maintain its foothold in the region, seeks to turn a new leaf in bilateral relations with Syria. However, can this be achieved?

Russia’s Historical Influence in Syria

Russia’s involvement in Syria dates to the Cold War, when Soviet Syrian relations were a key part of Moscow’s power projection in the Middle East. Tartous, home to Russia’s only Mediterranean naval base, has long been viewed by the Kremlin as a vital strategic asset. Maintaining access to this base is central to Russia’s regional influence, enabling it to conduct operations across the Middle East and North Africa. However, the fall of Assad has significantly weakened Russia’s leverage.

According to Nikola Mikovic, an analyst on Russian foreign policy, Moscow’s recent global setbacks—most notably in Ukraine, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia—have further eroded its influence in Syria. “Following its debacle in Ukraine and the loss of much of its global influence, the Kremlin has lost much of its leverage in Syria,” Mikovic notes. “Despite this, Moscow is desperate to preserve its bases in the country, as they allow it to continue conducting subversive operations in Africa.”

Challenges in Negotiating with the New Syrian Government

The new temporary leadership under President Ahmed al-Sharaa is setting strict conditions for Russia if it wishes to maintain positive relations with Damascus.

Al-Sharaa, the former leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and a key opposition figure, was officially announced by Syria’s state news agency (SANA) as the country’s new “transitional president” until a new constitution is adopted.

He has declared that one of his administration’s top priorities is ensuring stability and social cohesion in the post-Assad era. However, this also includes holding accountable those responsible for crimes under the previous regime, including Assad himself. Syria’s new rulers have demanded the extradition of the former Syrian leader and the compensation for the victims during the 14-year war. If these conditions are not met, Russia’s continued presence in the Mediterranean may be in jeopardy.

Mikovic argues that while the new Syrian leadership may want Russia out, it lacks the autonomy to make such a move independently. “They are heavily dependent on foreign powers, particularly Turkey and Western countries, which means they lack the autonomy to make significant decisions, such as allowing Russia to preserve its military presence in the Middle Eastern country,” he explains. This suggests that even if Damascus desires a full Russian exit, external geopolitical dynamics will heavily influence the outcome.

The Role of Turkey and the West

One of the biggest obstacles for Moscow is Türkiye’s control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, which Russian naval vessels must navigate to reach Syria. Mikovic highlights this dependency, stating that “even if the new Syrian authorities strike a deal with Moscow, the Kremlin will face the same challenge it has in the past: it will remain heavily dependent on Türkiye’s ‘goodwill.’” Ankara’s leverage means that Russia’s ability to maintain a presence in Syria is at least partially dictated by Turkish interests.

Meanwhile, Western nations may see Assad’s fall as an opportunity to pressure Russia out of Syria entirely. If the U.S. and European powers throw their weight behind the new leadership, Moscow could be forced to make strategic trade-offs elsewhere—perhaps in Ukraine—to retain its foothold in the Middle East. As Mikovic puts it, “to maintain the Russian military presence in Syria, the Kremlin will have to make some concessions to its Western partners, whether in Ukraine or elsewhere.”

Ultimately, Russia faces an uphill battle in preserving its presence in post-Assad Syria. With diminished global influence, reliance on Turkish-controlled waterways, and a new Syrian leadership that may not be inclined to accommodate Russian interests, Moscow’s ability to maintain its long-standing role in the region remains uncertain. However, given the strategic importance of Syria that is perceived by the Kremlin, is Russia willing to make hard choices to prove it’s a vital partner in the new phase of Syria’s future?

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