The limits of proxy politics: As the Syrian chessboard resets, Russia grows uneasy

The AnewZ Opinion section provides a platform for independent voices to share expert perspectives on global and regional issues. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official position of AnewZ

What has unfolded in northern Syria recently is not the dramatic defeat of a community, nor a humanitarian parable of “betrayal”. It reflects a familiar pattern in Middle Eastern geopolitics: the quiet removal of a proxy whose strategic usefulness has expired.

The dismantling of Kurdish-controlled structures in northeastern Syria followed a U.S.-brokered deal that returned territory to Damascus while addressing Turkish security demands. The outcome effectively ends the Kurdish card as an independent variable in the Syrian equation.

For Moscow, this development is highly unsettling: it signals a broader erosion of Russian leverage in a conflict once believed manageable through calibrated balancing. The Kurdish project in Syria was never an end in itself for Russia - it was a variable, a pressure point, a bargaining chip. With the Kurdish factor removed, Russia faces a more rigid regional alignment dominated by Ankara’s assertiveness and Washington’s transactional disengagement.

The Russian press has covered the issue cautiously, but the moment compels a reassessment of Syria’s future and Russia’s role in shaping it.

Assad legacy, the collapse of federal illusions, and the price of miscalculation

For years, Moscow entertained the idea that Syria might emerge from its civil war as a formally unified but informally decentralised state. Kurdish self-rule, carefully circumscribed and constitutionally subordinate to Damascus, represented one element of that vision. Federalisation, or something resembling it, offered Russia a way to preserve Syrian territorial integrity while keeping multiple actors dependent on ‘Russian mediation’.

However, after several global crises and Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, the vision of Syrian federalisation under Russia's shadow is now dead.

Washington’s signal that Kurdish forces were "expendable" in the larger bargain with Türkiye triggered the near-instant collapse of Kurdish autonomy. Syrian forces swiftly targeted the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a symbol of the wider Kurdish regional presence.

Thus, the rapid dismantling of the SDF’s Kurdish administrative and military structures has closed the chapter on federal illusions in Syria, at least for now. The Kurdish leadership’s long-standing gamble, that external patrons could indefinitely shield them from regional rivals, has failed.

Several commentators have already pointed out that by overestimating American commitment and underestimating Turkish resolve, Kurdish authorities trapped themselves in a dependent position with no exit strategy.

From Moscow’s standpoint, this outcome is strategically damaging. The Kurdish factor once allowed Russia to act as a broker between Ankara and Damascus, extracting concessions from both. With that factor gone, Russia’s room for manoeuvre narrows considerably. Power is now consolidating through bilateral deals, and Moscow is not always the primary architect.

New leadership structures in Damascus, backed by Russia and a host of other external variables, further complicate the picture. Russia continues to emphasise minority protections and Syrian sovereignty, but its ability to enforce either is increasingly constrained.

Ironically, the Kurdish leadership’s refusal to integrate into a Syrian political settlement under favourable conditions has led to a far harsher outcome. Reintegration occurs without leverage, guarantees, or autonomy. This is not a tragedy - it is the price of strategic miscalculation.

Russia and Israel: Convergence in cold realism on the Kurdish question

Despite their profound differences on some regional issues, Russia and Israel, have long shared a strikingly similar approach to the "Kurdish factor". Neither state ever viewed Kurdish formations in Syria as a viable sovereign project. Instead, both regarded them as ‘temporary instruments’ - useful in constraining adversaries, destabilising rivals, or filling power vacuums, but ultimately unsustainable as independent actors.

Moscow perceived Kurdish self-administration in northern Syria functioning as a controllable buffer. It restrained Turkish expansion, limited American freedom of manoeuvring, and pressured Damascus into political flexibility. For Israel, Kurds were a tactical counterweight during its regional isolation, deep humanitarian crises in Palestine, its "self-declared war" against several groups, and Iranian influence. Yet, they were never considered a partner destined for long-term statehood.

Recent events have demonstrated a shared conclusion in Moscow and Jerusalem that the Kurdish proxy model has reached its limit. This reasoning is not a betrayal - it is a predictable outcome of dependency politics.

Russian analysts and mainstream media increasingly frame it as an exhaustion of a role that could not be sustained once external sponsorship weakened. Israeli strategic thinking mirrors this logic: proxies are tolerated only as long as they serve a defined security purpose. When they begin to complicate broader arrangements, they are quietly sidelined.

From a different perspective, such a convergence does not necessarily imply coordination between Russia and Israel. However, this reveals a shared understanding that ambiguous semi-autonomies, sustained by foreign guarantees rather than regional consensus, are liabilities in the long run.

Russia and Türkiye: ‘Functional partnership’ under structural strain

One of the clearest insights from this episode concerns the dynamics of Russian-Turkish relations. Publicly, Moscow and Ankara continue to project pragmatic cooperation, with open channels and restrained rhetoric. Behind the scenes, however, the balance is shifting, and some commentators in Russia suggest it favours Ankara.

Türkiye has emerged as the key beneficiary of the Kurdish factor removal. By neutralising what it perceives as a security threat along its southern border, Ankara has consolidated influence across northern Syria. At the same time, Türkiye maintained formal dialogue with both Washington and Moscow.

This is strategic flexibility at its most effective.

For Russia, the situation is uncomfortable. Ankara’s gains come at the expense of a multipolar Syrian settlement Moscow spent years trying to engineer. Yet Russia cannot afford a confrontation with Türkiye. Energy ties, trade, regional diplomacy, and Ankara’s ambiguous relationship with NATO all compel restraint.

Russia faces a paradox: it objects to the outcome but tolerates the process. The Kremlin criticises externally imposed arrangements while quietly adapting to them. The removal of the Kurdish proxy accelerates this trend, eliminating one of the few tools Moscow had to offset Turkish dominance on the ground.

The deeper issue, however, is structural. For over seventy years, Türkiye has operated within the NATO framework, even during periods of strained relations with the West. Moscow understands that Ankara’s autonomy has limits. It also recognises that Türkiye has learned to leverage geopolitical ambiguity far more effectively than most regional actors.

The fragile Russian-Turkish partnership survives not because of aligned interests, but because neither side is prepared to pay the cost of open rivalry.

Russia in Syria after ‘the Kurdish interlude’

Russia’s scepticism toward contemporary Kurdish-related developments, in Syria or elsewhere, stems from long historical familiarity, not from ignorance, hostility, or friendship. Long before the Kurdish issue became a geopolitical factor, Russian scholars in 19th-century St. Petersburg were already documenting Kurdish language, folklore, and social structures as part of the empire’s broader tradition of Oriental studies.

This academic engagement, later institutionalised during the Soviet period, gave Russia an unusually deep understanding of Kurdish society, its internal divisions, and its recurring reliance on external patrons. That historical perspective helps explain Moscow’s present-day realism. Russia has seen Kurdish movements rise and fall repeatedly and understands that cultural recognition does not automatically translate into sustainable statehood or sudden strategic autonomy.

In Realpolitik terms, the current removal of the Kurdish variable from Syria’s political equation marks the end of a transitional phase in the conflict. It closes a chapter in which proxy forces, emboldened by external actors, masqueraded as autonomous political entities. What lies ahead is likely to be more centralised, more coercive, and far less tolerant of semi-independent power structures.

For Russia, this marks a moment of recalibration. The loss of the Kurdish card diminishes Moscow’s flexibility, but it does not erase its relevance. Russia remains entrenched in Syrian institutions, maintains influence in Damascus, and retains its relevance in regional diplomacy. However, Moscow will now try to operate in a narrower corridor, increasingly shaped by Turkish assertiveness and American disengagement.

The lesson to be learned is not about Kurdish weakness. It is about the limits of proxy politics in a region where power ultimately flows from state capacity, regional consensus, and strategic patience. Those who mistake temporary sponsorship for lasting protection inevitably realise how quickly the rules can change.

In Syria, that discovery has already been made.

Tags

Syria Russia Opinion grows