Shrinking Europe meets rising right-wing politics

Europe is entering a period of long-term population decline just as right-wing parties push to restrict migration. A widening gap now separates Europe’s demographic needs from its political choices.

When Angela Merkel declared in 2010 that “Multikulti has utterly failed,” she was speaking to Germany’s unresolved struggle with integration. The phrase resonated across Europe and shaped debates about identity, yet it appeared just as the continent’s demographic foundations were shifting.

Fertility was falling, the working-age population was tightening and natural population decline had begun in much of the EU. Europe focused on culture as demographic pressures quietly gathered strength. Seen from today, that moment marked the beginning of a political trajectory that would later collide with demographic reality.

The demographic decline that frames every future decision 
Eurostat and the European Commission now describe Europe’s demographic path as structural and long-term. The EU population of roughly 450 million in 2025 is projected to fall by about 22 million by 2050, reaching 428 million. Fertility remains near 1.5 births per woman, well below the 2.1 replacement rate, and even a rapid uptick would not reverse the trend because the population of childbearing age has already contracted. This demographic inertia ensures continued decline.

Meanwhile, other regions expand rapidly. Sub-Saharan Africa, home to around 1.5 billion people today, is expected to reach 2.5 billion by 2050 and drive more than half of future global population growth, pushing the world toward a projected peak of 10.4 billion around 2080. Europe’s relative shrinking has implications for competitiveness, labour supply and geopolitical weight.

UNFPA research shows Europe’s fertility problem is driven by structural factors: rising living costs, job insecurity, limited childcare, housing pressures and health issues such as infertility. Gender inequality compounds these constraints. Europeans generally want more children than they have, but conditions do not allow it.

The Joint Research Centre notes that migration and fertility must be viewed together. Fertility affects population structure only over decades, while migration influences workforce numbers immediately. Even with migration adding about one million people each year, Europe will continue to age because retirees far outnumber younger cohorts entering the labour market. The EU is expected to lose between one and two million workers annually in the coming decades, a trend already visible in essential sectors.

Institutions such as the ECB and EBRD warn that ageing will reshape pension systems, strain public budgets and lower productivity. These pressures are structural and require sustained responses.

The fertility issue politics cannot fix
Despite the evidence, political debate in Europe increasingly treats declining birth rates as a cultural matter. Appeals to traditional family norms or small financial incentives rarely change fertility behaviour. Countries that perform better on fertility tend to offer predictable employment, affordable housing and strong childcare support — not cultural conservatism.

This mismatch between political narratives and demographic evidence forms the first half of Europe’s dilemma: addressing fertility requires long-term investment, but political cycles favour short-term messaging.

Migration: the only short-term lever — and the centre of Europe’s political backlash
Migration has accounted for almost all EU population growth since 2012 and remains the only immediate way to slow workforce decline. Healthcare, construction, agriculture, logistics, engineering and research all depend heavily on foreign workers.

Yet politics is moving sharply in the opposite direction. The 2024 European Parliament elections strengthened right-wing parties across the continent, pushing mainstream actors toward restrictive migration positions. In Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Scandinavia, migration debates have shifted from economic need to cultural anxiety. Carnegie Europe calls migration the symbolic axis of European politics — the point where demographic necessity meets political resistance.

Right-wing solutions — and the limits of their arguments
Right-wing parties present a different response to demographic decline. Their message centres on limiting migration and encouraging higher birth rates among native populations. They argue that migration threatens cohesion, overloads welfare systems and is not a sustainable demographic strategy.

Parties such as the AfD, Rassemblement National, the Lega, Fratelli d’Italia and the PVV promote pronatalist policies — child bonuses, tax benefits, subsidised housing and support for single-income households — alongside tighter citizenship rules and reduced welfare access for migrants.

These proposals offer political clarity but do not address the structural pressures identified by UNFPA and the JRC. Without tackling housing costs, childcare capacity, job security and gender inequality, fertility does not rise meaningfully. And even if birth rates increased tomorrow, it would take decades for those children to enter the workforce. Europe is losing workers now.

This creates a political paradox: parties rising on demographic anxiety propose measures that cannot stabilise Europe’s population in the time frame required.

How the dilemma unfolds across Europe
Germany faces more than 700,000 vacancies today and risks a shortfall of up to seven million workers by 2035, yet political pressure from the AfD limits the space for pragmatic migration reform.

France’s fertility has fallen to historic lows and labour shortages spread across construction, transport and social care, but migration remains debated through the lens of identity and security.

Italy, with fertility around 1.18 and one of the oldest populations in the world, faces rapid workforce contraction, yet political attention remains fixed on border control rather than structural renewal.

The Netherlands relies on international students and high-skilled migrants, yet political momentum has shifted toward restricting both, despite clear economic dependence.

Across member states, demographic needs and political pressures diverge in the same direction.

How Europe can navigate the tension
Europe cannot reverse demographic decline immediately, but it can shape its consequences. Supporting family formation through secure employment, affordable housing, extensive childcare and gender-equal workplaces is essential for long-term demographic stability. Migration remains the only short-term mechanism to reinforce the labour market while such reforms take root.

The question is not whether Europe should choose migration or fertility, but whether its politics can reflect demographic reality rather than electoral mood.

A continent defined by its dilemma
Europe is entering a period of long-term population decline just as right-wing parties push to restrict migration. This contradiction will define the continent’s economic, social and political landscape far more deeply than any single election.

Merkel’s Multikulti remark captured Europe’s unease fifteen years ago; today, the dilemma is larger, structural and unavoidable. Whether Europe adapts or moves further into demographic contraction will depend on its willingness to confront the widening gap between what its population needs and what its politics permit.

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