Rhetoric surrounding Russia’s war against Ukraine is once again shifting toward talk of a possible “diplomatic solution.”

The most discussed version of a peace deal is a 28-point plan built around Moscow’s maximalist demands.

According to reporting by Barak Ravid and Dave Lawler of Axios, the Trump administration is developing this plan to end the war in Ukraine, using the Gaza peace initiative model as its reference point.

The “deal,” the article says, is divided into four key categories: “peace in Ukraine,” “security guarantees,” “security in Europe,” and “future U.S. relations with Russia and Ukraine.”

The main U.S. drafter was Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff, while the Russian counterpart was Kirill Dmitriev, the head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund.

The consequences of adopting this plan extend far beyond Ukraine. In its current form, it could reshape the rules of the international system, transform the security architecture across the post Soviet region, and undermine the foundations of global order.

These consequences would affect countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

If adopted, the proposed plan would mark the first time since World War II that the international community effectively recognised a major change of borders resulting from a full scale act of Russian aggression. A document legitimising Russian control over Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk would overturn three pillars of international stability.

The Helsinki Final Act (1975)
It enshrines two core principles: the inviolability of borders and the prohibition on changing them by force without mutual consent. If the international community endorses the result of military annexation, this document loses its normative weight. It becomes something that can be disregarded if one possesses sufficient military power.

The Almata Declaration (1991)
Newly independent states on the post Soviet space agreed that the borders of the former Soviet republics would become international borders, and that all parties would respect each other’s territorial integrity. Legitimising the annexation of Ukrainian territories effectively dismantles this agreement.

The borders confirmed by the Alma Ata Declaration could then be reinterpreted by Moscow for its own benefit. This poses a threat not only to Ukraine, but to Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the states of Central Asia.

Principles of the UN Charter (Article 2(4))
The Charter strictly prohibits “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” If a forced change of borders receives international recognition through a pressured “peace deal,” a new reality emerges where the “law of force” overrides the “force of law.”

Point 7 of the proposed plan, which bans Ukraine from joining NATO, creates a dangerous precedent by institutionalising the right of external powers to impose geopolitical vetoes on the defence policy and alliance choices of sovereign states.

In effect, it accepts the notion that the security status of small and medium sized countries is determined not by their own decisions, but by the preferences of larger powers. This is a reversal of the Helsinki process and of the UN Charter’s core principle that states are free to choose their alliances.

If Ukraine’s NATO future can be closed under pressure from a third party, the mechanism becomes universal. Russia could later invoke a “zone of vital interests” and demand restrictions on alliance choices in neighbouring countries. This logic could be applied, for example, to challenge the Shusha Declaration on allied relations between Azerbaijan and Türkiye or cooperation within the Organization of Turkic States.

Return to a 19th-century mindset: the 'concert of powers'

One of the most troubling and systemically dangerous elements of the proposed plan is its attempt to return the international system to the logic of a “concert of great powers,” where core security issues are decided by a handful of major states without the participation of others. In such a model, legal norms and international organisations recede to the background, and the agency of small and medium-sized states becomes uncertain.

For decades, the international system has been built on the foundation that state sovereignty is absolute, all states possess equal legal standing, and decisions are made within the framework of the UN Charter. The proposed plan effectively nullifies these principles. It establishes a practice in which geopolitical deals between Washington and Moscow override international norms and determine the fate of individual states without their involvement.

This is a return to the Vienna Congress model of 1815, where Europe’s security was decided without the input of smaller countries, or to Yalta in 1945.

How border changes in Ukraine could reshape Eurasian security

Ukraine is one of the principal heirs of the USSR. If its borders can be revised, what prevents similar revisions of other republics formed under the same legal conditions? Recognising territorial seizures in one case creates a universal precedent, regardless of claims that it is a “unique situation.” In international law, exceptions always become starting points for further demands.

Barring Ukraine from joining NATO effectively revives the logic of spheres of influence. In the original Yalta system, great powers divided the world into zones of responsibility, and smaller states lost agency. Today, this approach would once again mean that the fate of states is decided “over their heads.”

This is why the precedent of altering borders by force represents the central systemic risk for all post Soviet states, including Azerbaijan, where stable borders form the foundation of strategic security.

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