NATO’s New Approach: Strategic Ambiguity and the Long-Term Defence of Europe

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In the wake of the October EU summit in Copenhagen, Europe’s security architecture seems to be entering a new phase.

The mood is no longer exclusively reactive or tactical; rather, an emerging posture of strategic ambiguity, sustained resilience, and long‑term confrontation management is taking root. With Russia increasingly resorting to hybrid warfare methods — from drone harassment to cyber intrusion to sabotage of undersea cables — NATO and the EU must now defend not just discrete borders but the integrity of the European security space as a whole.

A shifting NATO approach: from forward defence to dynamic deterrence

First, NATO is recalibrating its posture on the Eastern flank. In September, reacting to drone incursions into Polish airspace, the alliance launched Operation Eastern Sentry — a flexible, integrated deployment of allied air and maritime assets intended to deter rather than merely respond. Rather than stationing permanently large static formations, the emphasis now is on agility, surge capacity, rapid reinforcement, and unpredictable basing. This kind of ambiguous posture — where an adversary cannot reliably predict where NATO will appear — is a deliberate shift toward deterrence by uncertainty.

At June 2025 Hague NATO Summit, allies also committed to a new defence spending target: 5 percent of GDP, split between core defence and related support. This underlines NATO’s tacit acknowledgment that we may be in a protracted security competition rather than a short war: sustaining readiness, depth, and industrial capacity over years will matter as much as deploying today’s troops.

Europe’s eastern and southern borders: the new loci of multi-domain contestation

The Eastern Flank: drones, sabotage, cables, and air denial

The Eastern border of Europe — with Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia as neighbors — is now the front line of hybrid competition. What used to be the zone of conventional military threat is now the theater of “gray-zone” operations: low-cost drone intrusions, sabotage of critical infrastructure, cyber operations targeting communications and energy, and even submarine targeting of undersea cables.

To counter that, European and NATO capitals are pushing a “drone wall” concept — a layered system of sensors, jammers, interceptor drones, and networked detection along the eastern border. This is not a literal wall, but a contested aerial buffer zone meant to deny hostile drones freedom of operation. In parallel, NATO is intensifying efforts to secure undersea infrastructure — especially cables and pipelines — via the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network initiative.

Hybrid air denial has also become a doctrinal challenge: adversaries now use swarms of low-cost drones or loitering munitions to harass airspace, degrade commercial activity, and force defensive reactions. In such an environment, advanced surface-to-air systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and resilient air traffic defence networks assume greater importance.

The Southern Flank: migration, maritime intrusion, and southern periphery pressures

While the eastern confrontation commands most headlines, southern Europe cannot be neglected. The Mediterranean remains vulnerable to maritime infiltration, asymmetric naval threats, gray-zone sabotage, and migration pressures that adversaries could weaponize. NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian has long been the default maritime security tool in the Mediterranean, but it must evolve into a more robust instrument for hybrid deterrence in the south.

Moreover, EU states around the Black Sea (Romania, Bulgaria, potentially Türkiye in a partnership role) are exposed to Russia’s hybrid influence campaigns — disinformation, cyber attacks, pressure on energy dependencies, and political subversion. In that context, a coordinated southern flank posture — linking NATO naval assets, EU border agencies, satellite surveillance, and naval domain awareness — is indispensable.

Strategic ambiguity as a posture, not a gamble

A key characteristic of the emerging approach is embracing strategic ambiguity. Rather than placing all our cards on predictable static defenses, NATO and the EU should adopt doctrines that keep adversaries guessing — about where forces may concentrate, how cyber and electronic warfare layers might be leveraged, or when surge deployments may materialize. This ambiguity is not weakness but deterrent leverage. In hybrid competition, surprise, flexibility, and layered defence are powerful.

That said, ambiguity must not become arbitrariness. Effective coordination, clear rules of engagement and escalation, and secure communications are prerequisites. The ProtectEU strategy, just rolled out by the European Commission, is precisely aimed at forging deeper legal, institutional, and technical resilience frameworks across EU states (especially through implementation of NIS2, cyber critical infrastructure protections, and secure telecom networks). The EU must provide backbone architectures (e.g. European Critical Communication System) that ensure cross‑border coordination in crises.

Integrating partners and candidate countries: building inclusive resilience

Europe’s security can no longer be neatly partitioned into NATO core members vs. outsiders. Candidate and partner states (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,
the Western Balkans) lie within the zone of confrontation. The new European security approach must integrate these countries into layered deterrence.

For example: secure data links, shared cyber defence platforms, early-warning radar, civil resilience aid, and counter-hybrid training should all extend beyond current EU members. Joint exercises combining NATO, EU, and partner contingents can reinforce norms and interoperability. The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) in Helsinki is already a model for shared learning and experimentation.

Investing in the defence-industrial capacity of candidate states (e.g. munitions, drone manufacturing, resilience tech) not only helps local defence but broadens the base of deterrent supply chains.

The “marathon, not a sprint” mindset: preparing for long-haul confrontation

Finally, this new doctrine rests on the assumption that Europe may be locked into a prolonged competition with Russia. Moscow’s hybrid approach is well adapted to creeping, sustained pressure: see the sharp rise in European sabotage and subversion incidents in recent years. Therefore, Europe must plan for durability — stockpile munitions, diversify supply chains for critical technologies (chips, sensors, AI, resilient telecom), cultivate sovereign capability in defense R&D, and develop modular force structures that scale. This is why spending commitments (5 percent GDP) matter. It’s not just about more tanks tomorrow, but about sustained innovation, resilience, and force generation over decades. The balance must shift from short-term crisis response to structural readiness.

Conclusion

Europe—and NATO—are now venturing into a new security era: defined neither by benign peace nor full-scale war, but by a hybrid confrontation across domains, time horizons, and borders. The post‑Copenhagen “EU summit +” posture reveals a blend of deterrence by ambiguity, adaptive deployment, and infrastructure resilience. The challenge is immense: to weave together frontline defence on the East, southern flank vigilance, integration of partner states, and a long-haul industrial and strategic backbone. But in that challenge lies the future security of the European project: a Europe that defends not just lines on a map, but the durability of democratic sovereignty itself.

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