A ‘Blink’ Moment of the Russia – Ukraine War

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The war in Ukraine has reached a strategic impasse, and it seems that the conflict will not be solved by military means. This creates a path toward one of two alternatives: either a “frozen” phase that can last indefinitely or a quest for a durable political regulation.

The strategic stalemate that has emerged after three and a half years of hostilities offers little hope of a fast and clear victory for either Moscow or Kyiv. If one of them had the technical and social capacity to mobilize enough forces and resources to break the deadlock, it would most probably have done so, as prolonging the conflict beyond a point of psychological endurance threatens internal stability. Despite the differences between the regimes, for the time being, both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky found it useful to instrumentalize the external conflict to solve internal problems. Uniting people around the flag, marginalizing the opposition and projecting the wartime agenda on current social problems proved effective in maintaining legitimacy and staying in power.

The ‘Blink’ Moment, War Fatigue, and Rational Choice

Applying the logic of the “Laffer curve” to this conflict reveals a relationship between wartime patriotic mobilization and regime stability. In both cases, the “turning point” has been reached and passed, confronting both presidents with an urgent need to conclude the war—not in the name of any specific interests or ethical imperatives, but in the name of the existential threat that the conflict poses to their respective regimes.

In “Machiavellian” terms of practical utility, the war no longer serves the interests of either side, making its conclusion the most reasonable outcome. Although, from moral, economic, and social perspectives, the end of hostilities would be a success for both sides, justifying it will be ideologically difficult due to the zero-sum rhetoric that the sides adopted during the mobilization phase of the conflict. Transforming their official thinking and their political behaviour from mobilization to demobilization, a change already happening in both societies, is a ‘blink’ moment of this war, to put it in Malcolm Gladwell’s terms. Both accumulated enough experience to recognise that ending of war the most rational choice among all available options.

Both countries, both societies, and both presidents already know that this war no longer makes sense, and that, under current conditions, there is no good argument for continuing it. Any potential compromise ceasefire is perceived as illegitimate and unfair—as every ceasefire in history is, until it is concluded.

Peace and dangers of strategic pause

Clearly, the largest continental conflict in Europe since 1945 will have an impact on the system of international relations, completely reshaping the geopolitical landscape. This reflects the nature of war and its influence on the international order: it changes people, countries, rules, and mechanisms. It changes them not according to either side’s plans, but spontaneously and chaotically. The order that emerges from the chaos very rarely conforms to anyone’s initial design.

In practical terms, the end of the war will alter Russia, Ukraine, their bilateral relationship, and their position in Europe compared to before February 2022. They will be unlike what anyone planned, and their future shape is not predetermined. All these elements of the post-war international reality are currently in the making.

The most important element shaping the structure and dynamics of Russia-Ukraine relations—and, by extension, their relations with other partners—will be how both countries respond to the eternal question of war and peace. This is the fundamental choice they faced between 2021 and 2022, and then several more times during the subsequent rounds of peace-talks attempts, including the most recent “Alaskan” attempt initiated by President Trump. It will remain the central question—even when a ceasefire is concluded.

Whether the conclusion of the war is seen as the definitive end, and within what time frame (short, medium or long term), will determine the internal structure of their respective statehoods, the ideological organization of their nationhoods, their bilateral relations, and their ties with external partners. In other words, their interpretation of the outcome of this war—and whether they choose to treat it as a permanent reality—will determine whether it leads to a lasting peace or a new war.

Will Russia and Ukraine come to terms with the new reality shaped by the war, or will they perceive a ceasefire as a transitional period—a strategic peredyshka—in which the war-oriented thinking will be masked behind peace-oriented phraseology? In the former case, both sides have a chance for a ‘new opening’ in their relations, based on a restructured foundation. In the latter, they remain trapped within the old framework, where any dialogue risks triggering a new conflict.

The war no one needs

Taken rationally, a ‘blink’ moment should convince both sides that the decision to wage war was a suboptimal one. After its conclusion, their relations—including the most problematic issues—should be addressed through other, non-military means.

But states and societies are directed by humans, and human decision-making, which is not entirely rational. By fighting this war, both Russia and Ukraine—especially Russia, which initiated it—has lost more than it gained. Without this war, Moscow’s internal and external position in the world would have been more favourable for realising its national interests than it is now.

From the perspective of rationality, the war was a mistake that was committed and, to some extent acknowledged. The new strategic objective is to ensure that this mistake is not repeated. War, as a purely destructive phenomenon—both physically and psychologically—is bad for people and certainly worse than peace.

Even if Moscow miscalculated and initially perceived the decision to start the war as rational, the course of events has since produced enough evidence to prompt a ‘blink’—a strategic intuition that most, if not all, alternative paths are more advantageous. From the perspective of national interests and cost-benefit analysis, peace has become a more attractive outcome. Consequently, all decisions, including those vis-à-vis Ukraine, should be approached through peace-oriented lenses.

Other European nations needed several centuries of fighting, including two hyper-destructive world wars, to come to this conclusion. It is an interesting question, both theoretically and practically, whether Russians and Ukrainians have already reached their own ‘blink’ moment after three and a half years of fighting.

The war in Ukraine has not transformed into a continental or global conflict. Despite the hysterical tones of propaganda produced by both sides, it remains a bilateral, localised war of a limited geographical and strategic scope. Regardless of several attempts by both sides to escalate it–both horizontally and vertically–it remains unchanged: a conflict over borders between two post-colonial nations in the making, not a fundamental structural shift that would shape a new world order.

If other countries and nations had wanted to join the conflict on either side, they would have already done so, using one of the incidents as a casus belli. The recent violation of Polish airspace by Russian drones could have served as perfect example, had there been a political will to fight a war. But the will is absent, and that is why the war will not transform into a continental or global confrontation.

While other countries may use this war to advance their own agendas, they will not enter the conflict directly. The ‘blink’ reaction–entirely negative–has been deeply and, as it turns out, durably enrooted in their mentality long ago, preventing them from making such a mistake.

For European countries and their citizens, the outcome of this war, the future of Russia and Ukraine–as well as their relations–are less important than the fact that they are not directly involved in its active phase.

Europeans, like Americans—who had to go through Iraq and Afghanistan to confront their imperial hubris and develop their own ‘blink’ reaction to the war —don’t want to take part in this war, and they will not.

The ongoing conflict does not threaten continental, let alone global, stability. Thus, for much of the international community—which has already adapted to its presence—it has become a non-factor—just like the Iraq-Iran war or Israel-Palestine conflict. The former lasted for eight years; the latter lasts for decades. Yet the cruel reality is that it does not change the lives of those not directly involved.

By now, it should be obvious to Moscow and Kyiv that, in relation to their war, the world —to use the framework of Elisabeth Kübler-Ross—has moved from denial, through anger, bargaining, and depression, to acceptance. And precisely because they will not fight it themselves, the international community views the continuation of the war in its current form as a second-best option after a ceasefire.

Ideally, Russia and Ukraine would choose to stop the war. But if they do not, the conflict will continue in a way that allows Europe and America to remain at a distance. On the one hand, this can be seen as Machiavellian cynicism; on the other, there is no doubt that the fact that people don’t want to go and kill other people represents a moral progress.

If Russia and Ukraine choose to continue fighting, they have the sovereign right to do so—despite the immorality, irresponsibility, and irrationality of such a decision. Yet historical experience shows that when individuals, elites, and nations ignore the ‘blink’ moment—when the facts make the right decision clear—they inevitably slide further down the strategic ‘Laffer curve’, worsening their position.

Neither Russia nor Ukraine will benefit from this war anymore and they already know that. It is interesting to see when and where will that knowledge transform into decisions.

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