Why the European Union Now Sees Albania and Montenegro as Crucial Members-in-Waiting

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The European Union stands today at a critical juncture, facing a rapidly shifting global order that demands reinforced alliances and accelerated enlargement.

Some enlargements will be contentious, while others are straightforward and largely undisputed, as it is the case with the two countries referred to in this analysis.

Nowhere is this trend more visible than in the Union’s renewed focus on the Western Balkans, with Albania and Montenegro poised to become full members by 2028 or 2029, sooner than many anticipated. This push reflects not only the EU’s aspiration for a bigger and more resilient union but also responds directly to the complex pressures of international competition and regional instability.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has actively sought to fortify its southern and eastern borders, accelerating the candidacies of states that embrace European norms and values. Albania and Montenegro exemplify this new momentum. As Marta Kos, European Commissioner for Enlargement, recently affirmed: “If we finish the technical part of the accession negotiations in 2026, then in 2028 we could get the 28th member of the EU. Albania could join as the 29th member in 2029.” She underlined the non-negotiable terms of entry: “Rule of law, human rights, fight against corruption, and free media are non-negotiable. All this has to be fulfilled.”

Commissioner Kos further observed that the traditional “candidate-fulfillment” process is being tested like never before: “For the first time, we are witnessing a situation where the traditional process of candidate countries fulfilling conditions and then joining the EU no longer applies. External forces now actively seek to block certain nations from accession, something unprecedented in past expansions.”

These statements clearly refer to North Macedonia, which, despite advancing at a pace of convergence with the EU comparable to that of Albania and Montenegro, suffers from cross-vetoes primarily imposed by Bulgaria and by its historic rival Greece. No EU member state currently seeks to block the accession of Albania or Montenegro, despite the enduring debate within the Union over whether enlargement represents an opportunity or a potential trap. France periodically returns to this matter in its diplomacy, sometimes appearing uncertain as it searches for a renewed sense of purpose in the international order.

This context sets Albania and Montenegro apart. As small states, their accession is less disruptive, while their reformist records mark them as model candidates. Albania’s pro-European consensus is especially notable: “77 percent of Albanians perceive EU membership as a positive step, compared to the regional average of 54 percent,” the Madrid-based Institute of Global Studies notes. Moreover, Albania shows 100 percent alignment with EU foreign and security policy, which is a strong indicator of its readiness.

The acceleration of integration is accompanied by symbolic gestures of confidence. The opening of the College of Europe campus in Tirana in 2024 not only provides elite training for future European leaders but also visibly demonstrates how seriously Brussels views these countries’ European destinies. The historical progression—from Bruges to Natolin and now to Tirana—shows how the College’s geographic expansion mirrors the EU’s path of continental integration and echoes its strategic ambitions in the Balkans.

The campus in Natolin, Poland, had been a clear message of support for the eastern enlargement in 2004. The inauguration of a new campus of the College of Europe in Albania also demonstrates a clear political will.

Albania the first future EU member state with a Muslim-majority

Albania’s accession will mark a historic milestone as the first EU member state with a Muslim-majority population, though highly secularized. This fact signals Europe’s openness to pluralism and its ability to act as a bridge to other countries, such as Azerbaijan, that share a secular Muslim heritage. Under the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Edi Rama, who has secured a fourth term, Albania now represents both stability and an exemplar of reformist ambition.

Montenegro’s path is equally significant but possesses additional geopolitical ramifications. Its accession would effectively round out the EU’s Adriatic front, isolating Serbia geopolitically and fulfilling the trajectory first promised by its swift NATO entry. Despite internal divisions and the continued influence of pro-Serb factions and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the overwhelming trend is toward alignment with European standards. Montenegro’s precedent—having been federated with Serbia until 2006—also underscores the geopolitical weight behind its candidacy. Its inclusion would round out the EU’s Adriatic presence and leave Serbia, whose relationship with Russia complicates its accession, surrounded by EU-aligned neighbors. While some pro-Serb sympathies and religious debates persist, the overarching political trajectory is clearly toward EU, not away.

On enlargement, Vesna Pusić, former Croatian Foreign Minister, provides a telling insight: “These countries are not just extension projects; their accession is an act of consolidation for Europe. That is, they are already enclaves nearly surrounded by EU countries.” She emphasizes the regional dividends of their accession: “No stable country without a stable neighborhood,” underscoring how further Balkan integration stabilizes the continent. While North Macedonia’s progress is notable, ongoing disputes with Bulgaria and Greece make near-term membership unlikely, reaffirming Albania and Montenegro’s front-runner status.

These enlargement efforts are part of a wider EU strategy to expand alliances as global fault lines harden. The imminent conclusion of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement (with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) will add over 750 million consumers to the EU’s preferential trading network and deepen cooperation on sustainability, free trade, and digital transition. This is a strategic counterweight to shifting international alliances during Donald Trump’s presidency and global economic volatility.

Simultaneously, recent partnership agreements with Central Asian countries—such as the July 2025 Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Tajikistan and a suite of sectoral agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—reflect the EU’s energy and security priorities in Eurasia. These deals strengthen supply chains, boost energy diversification, and open new development corridors critical for long-term European autonomy. But the European Union is well aware that its entire policy of good relations with Central Asia will only be feasible if the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is successfully concluded and the Zangezur Corridor is constructed. The Zangezur Corridor, a transport link connecting Azerbaijan’s mainland with its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southern Syunik province, is of great strategic importance. It is a crucial gateway for regional connectivity that could transform trade routes across the South Caucasus and Eurasia, enhance economic integration between Europe and Asia, and help stabilize a historically volatile region.

The Western Balkans’ integration and the accession of Albania and Montenegro are best viewed through the lens of consolidation and stabilization—through geopolitics, not simple growth. A united, inclusive Europe is the only route to the aspiration of a stable and influential continent prepared for the uncertainty of the decades ahead in a new and different multipolar world.

Dr. Jordi Xuclà is a lawyer and professor of International Relations at Abad Oliba University in Barcelona (Spain). He served as senator and member of the Spanish parliament (2000–2019) and, among other roles, was a member of the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe, the Union for the Mediterranean and NATO. He was also a member of the Committee for the Election of Judges of the European Court of Human Rights.

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