How Ukraine Uses Energy Warfare to Level the Fight

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The Chinese military strategist and thinker Sun Tzu, author of the legendary treatise "The Art of War," stated: “ In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power.

It is sufficient to estimate the enemy situation correctly and to concentrate your strength to capture him.”

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia has remained one of the key suppliers of energy resources to the global market. Despite the illegal annexation and temporary occupation of territories of Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), in 2021, Russia accounted for approximately 40% of the European Union’s natural gas imports, 25% of its oil imports, and more than 40% of its coal supply.

After February 2022, the supply of energy resources from Russia has been significantly restricted —and in some cases halted—due to Western sanctions and political decisions enacted by consuming countries. Despite these measures, the Russian economy has continued to accumulate the financial and material resources necessary to wage a war of aggression against Ukraine.

In the coming days, on October 16, 2025, the Industrial Committee of the European Parliament will vote on amendments to the EU’s “RePowerEU” plan. These amendments call for a complete cessation of imports of oil and petroleum products from Russia starting in 2026, as well as a full ban on gas supplies from 2027.

Therefore, identifying asymmetric responses to the forms and methods employed by Russia in its aggressive war against Ukraine—aimed at undermining Ukraine’s long-term economic potential—has long been a priority for military-political leadership in Kyiv.

In mid-October 2024, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky presented the so-called "Victory Plan" to Western partners. This comprehensive strategy encompassed several objectives—specifically the transfer of military operations onto Russian territory, lifting political-military restrictions on strikes deep within Russia, and the destruction or degradation of the combat readiness of Russian military aviation. In addition, the plan proposed measures for the potential expansion of the use of long-range drones and missiles to undermine the Russian war machine, including targeting its energy sector and defense-industrial complex, as well as securing timely access to intelligence from allied countries.

Attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and sustained long-range strikes within its territory can significantly erode Russia’s war effort. Yet their effects are much more complex, slow to emerge, and can produce both intended and unintended political, military, and economic consequences. 

Key among these effects is the crippling of fuel supplies and logistics, which reduces the mobility and operational tempo of Russian forces. Strikes on refineries, fuel depots, oil and gas deposits, and pipelines raise the cost and limit the availability of fuel for frontline units, transport, and aviation—slowing offensives, hindering supply convoys, and forcing rationing of sorties and vehicle movement. Recent reports from across Russia indicate that strikes on Russian refining and fuel logistics have already led to localized fuel shortages and forced operational adjustments.

According to open-source data, since the beginning of 2025, over 80 drone attacks have targeted Russian oil refineries, resulting in a 38% reduction of the country's refining capacity—approximately 120 million tons per year. Consequently, this has led to gasoline and diesel shortages in key regions, driving a 12–15% increase in retail prices (up to $0.699 per liter), queues at gas stations of up to 2–3 hours, and the widespread closure of around 500 private gas stations.

Furthermore, the attacks on fuel pumping stations and storage facilities in September 2025 have partially disrupted deliveries. Fuel supply delays have reached up to two weeks, with a regional shortage of 20–30%.

Second, disruptions to electricity grids and to defense and civilian industry can hinder arms production and the replenishment of equipment. Power outages at key industrial regions can reduce production rates for military suppliers, interrupt factory output, degrade command-and-control system, and impede medical facilities. Together, these effects undermine Russia’s capacity to maintain its military personnel, materiel, and medical support systems, demonstrating a direct link between energy availability and overall military readiness, as well as resilience. 

Third, sustained attacks would compel the Kremlin to divert resources to domestic repairs. Ongoing repair of critical infrastructure, hardening sites, and replacing lost production could force Moscow to divert budgets and industrial capacity from front-line military demands to homeland civilian reconstruction. It would amplify the economic cost of war of aggression and further slow military modernization already hampered by Western sanctions.

A steady upward trend in retail fuel prices has been observed across Russia, averaging 5–7% in September, with prices rising from $0.689 to $0.699 per litre within the month. Regional disparities remain significant: prices increased by 15% in the Samara region and by 20% in the Oryol region. State-owned gas stations registered a price increase of 5%, while private stations recorded an increase of 10–15%. Wholesale prices for gasoline increased by 40%, and for diesel by 45%.

Fourth, undermine exports and state fiscal revenues. Systematic strikes on the energy supply chain–pipelines, terminals, railways–can reduce export volumes or raise export costs, cutting state revenue that funds the military, thus creating a sustained fiscal squeeze. Energy market disruptions also elevate internal political risks and constrain defense procurement.

Attacks on fuel storage facilities and pumping stations have caused a significant reduction in Russian oil exports. During the first eight months of 2025, export volumes declined by 9.7–9.8%, from 113 to 102 million barrels per month.

As of today, the Russian Federation imports over 30% of its fuel from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Iran, incurring increased costs of approximately 20% due to Western sanctions and measures targeting the Russian “shadow fleet”. It is anticipated that by the end of October 2025, the fuel deficit will escalate further to 15%, driven by increased seasonal demand and a 5-7% rise in retail prices.

If attacks by the Defense Forces of Ukraine on Russia’s energy sector persist, and Western sanctions—particularly from the EU, the US, and other like-minded countries blocking the Russian “shadow fleet”—intensify, there is a high likelihood of a severe fuel crisis emerging within Russia.

Fifth, erode civil society morale and political support for Russia’s ruling elite. Attacks on domestic infrastructure can, over time, heighten public frustration and increase political costs. On the one hand, a protracted military conflict can potentially reduce social support for President Putin. On the other hand, these attacks can also produce a short-term effect that can be utilized by Russian authorities to justify harsher repression or broader mobilization. Consequently, the net political effect remains uncertain and time-dependent.

In the short term, if current efforts to repel Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine are maintained, and Ukraine continues to receive timely and precise intelligence on Russian energy assets, the operational tempo of Russian forces could be significantly reduced. This effect would be most visible in sectors dependent on fuel and military technology components. Continued strikes on the refineries and fuel infrastructure would likely lead to much lower sortie rates for aircraft and drones. Furthermore, disruptions to spare parts production and electrical power would also slow equipment repairs and lengthen supply cycles.

In the medium and long term, a growing share of the defense budget dedicated to sustaining the militarization of the economy will shift more industrial capacity toward military production, but with diminishing returns due to sanctions and technological gaps. Supply-chain reconfiguration takes time, reducing both the quality and quantity of replacements.  International energy markets may also reprice, affecting Russia’s trading partners and political leverage.

Well-targeted, sustained strikes on energy infrastructure, transport nodes, electrical substations, and depots can reduce Russian operational reach and increase costs and extend repair cycles, which could tilt the outcomes of local campaigns in Ukraine’s favor over the course of months.  Such a campaign requires persistent targeting, reliable intelligence, and political will.

Many Russians have already begun complaining about shortages and soaring gasoline prices. Meanwhile there is an almost total fuel collapse in Crimea and some regions of Russia. It means, that so-called “special military operation” against an independent Ukraine has real consequences. 

Continuing to strengthen sanctions against Russia, transferring frozen Russian assets to Ukraine, and expanding politico-military, military, and defense-technical cooperation between Ukraine and its partners — including the EU, the United States, and other like-minded nations — could not only help bring Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine to an end but also create favorable negotiation conditions in accordance with international law.

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