When European Union leaders agreed in April to hold a summit with China in late July, they believed they would enter the talks from a position of strength.

The U.S.-China trade war had escalated dramatically, with tariffs reaching 145%, while Europe had been granted a 90-day reprieve from President Donald Trump’s so-called 'Liberation Day' tariffs. At the time, Brussels hoped to finalize a transatlantic trade deal that would include coordinated pressure on Beijing.

But the geopolitical landscape has since shifted. Following recent U.S.-China talks in Geneva and London, the two sides reached a fragile trade truce. President Trump, who had initially raised tariffs, has since backed down—twice—leaving China feeling emboldened. Reports of a potential Trump trip to China with dozens of American CEOs further underscore this reversal, providing Beijing with symbolic leverage.

Meanwhile, Europe has failed to strike its own deal with Washington. EU leaders endured challenging G7 and NATO summits where they gained little on China policy, with no consensus reached to explicitly call out Beijing’s support for Russia or its trade practices. President Trump, unlike his predecessor Joe Biden, has shown little interest in such coordinated efforts.

As the EU-China summit approaches on 24–25 July, Brussels finds itself on uncertain footing. Within the EU, officials are split on how to proceed. Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič appears willing to trade tariff relief on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) for Beijing’s rollback of retaliatory measures and pledges to invest in Europe. Others within the EU institutions see this as dangerous appeasement, arguing that the bloc should resist what they describe as “coercion” and “blackmail” over rare earth exports.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, whose stance will be pivotal, recently accused Beijing of economic coercion during the G7 summit in Canada. The comments sparked backlash from China and cast doubt over the prospects for compromise.

Despite heightened tensions, Brussels has agreed to participate in a business roundtable with China for the first time since 2018. Scheduled for 25 July in Hefei, the meeting will include von der Leyen and Chinese Premier Li Qiang. While Beijing wants to showcase the event as a celebration of EU-China economic ties—including a visit to Volkswagen’s major Hefei hub—EU officials worry it could send the wrong message at a time when domestic concerns about over reliance on China are growing.

In Germany, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s administration has talked tough on reducing dependency on China, particularly in critical infrastructure. But concerns persist over how this rhetoric will translate into action. A pending decision on whether to allow Chinese turbines in a North Sea wind farm project—despite national security warnings—will serve as a key test of Berlin’s resolve.

Elsewhere, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul is reportedly focused on enforcing, not revising, the country’s 2023 China strategy. Germany and France are now coordinating more closely on China policy, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expected to visit Brussels, Berlin, and Paris this week.

As the EU-China summit nears, Europe’s strategy remains fragmented. While the European Commission continues to bear much of the burden in managing relations with Beijing, the need for stronger, more unified engagement from leading member states is becoming increasingly urgent.

Whether Europe can speak with one voice—and act decisively—may determine the tone of its relationship with China for years to come.

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