When others move the pieces: Europe’s waning influence in the Mediterranean

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Thirty years after launching its ambitious Euro-Mediterranean policy, Europe has lost influence in a region that should matter most to it. Today, in the Mediterranean, the European Union no longer sets the rules of the game, it endures them.

The paradox is striking: never before has the EU created such an extensive institutional architecture for the Mediterranean, and never before has it wielded so little real influence.

The contrast is clearer when we look elsewhere. While Brussels multiplies declarations and low-impact forums, some states have learned to navigate with flexibility in a rapidly changing world. Azerbaijan’s multivector foreign policy is a paradigm: Baku can involve Washington in a peace treaty, sit with Moscow weeks later, and participate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization soon after. This is 21st-century diplomacy: pragmatism, strategic autonomy, and the defense of national interests without rigid alignments. It stands in stark contrast with Brussels’ outdated diplomatic manuals, still clinging to nostalgia for a Mediterranean influence it no longer exerts.

From Barcelona to Bureaucracy

The 1995 Barcelona Process was Europe’s first serious attempt to build a balanced framework of cooperation with the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Its design was clear: dialogue among equals, centred on economic integration, political cooperation, and regional stability. It carried ambition and, above all, a sense of symmetry.

Everything changed in 2008, when French President Nicolas Sarkozy launched the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). By involving all EU members, the balance was lost: states in Central and Northern Europe, less invested in the region, slowed down momentum. The result was a heavy bureaucracy incapable of delivering tangible progress.

A few years later, Brussels shifted its attention eastward with the Eastern Partnership, offering closer ties to Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The Mediterranean, once the laboratory of EU neighborhood policy, slipped down the agenda.

The price of neglect has been high. Thirty years after Barcelona, North–South cooperation is fragile, South–South cooperation has withered, and the UfM struggles to prove its relevance. In practice, EU policy toward the Mediterranean is now reduced to fragmented migration management: Spain negotiates bilaterally with Morocco and Algeria, Italy improvises in Libya, and Greece clings to its border logic. There is no common strategy, only scattered national responses.

The Vacuum Filled by Others

Geopolitics does not tolerate a vacuum. Where Europe has retreated, others have advanced. Russia, Iran, the United States, Türkiye, and emerging Gulf and Asian powers have moved into the space Brussels abandoned.

Russia, weakened in Syria after years of war and growing dependence on Iran, has repositioned itself in eastern Libya, where it backs Khalifa Haftar with military and logistical support. This foothold in the southern Mediterranean complements its control of Crimea and the Black Sea, which gives Moscow temporary influence leverage over trade and energy routes toward the eastern Mediterranean. Even if it no longer dominates Damascus as before, Russia remains a disruptive player with veto power across the region.

Iran, through its network of support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Palestinian factions, has become an uncomfortable and dangerous actor in any Mediterranean security scenario. While Tehran extends influence through militias and ideological ties, Brussels issues statements that vanish into the air.

The United States, though inconsistent depending on the administration, retains unmatched hard power. Its alliance with Israel remains a pillar, but Washington’s strengthening of ties with Morocco has been even more significant. The U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in 2020 shifted the board. Europe, divided and hesitant, stayed on the sidelines of a decision directly affecting the stability of its southern neighbourhood. Major states like France and Germany are slowly edging closer to Rabat, but the EU as a whole has no common stance. Once again, others move the pieces while Brussels watches.

And then there is Türkiye. Ankara has understood that the Mediterranean is a theater of power and has made it a priority axis of foreign policy. Türkiye asserts claims over gas-rich waters in the eastern Mediterranean, intervenes decisively in Libya, and projects influence into the Sahel. It acts with pragmatism: aligning with Russia when convenient, with Washington when useful, and with Qatar when interests coincide. Türkiye, once a candidate for EU membership, no longer sees Brussels as its horizon. Today it plays with autonomy, initiative, and force. Europe has yet to find a structured way to engage with this “new Türkiye.”

External involvement is not limited to traditional powers. China has invested in strategic ports like Piraeus in Greece and Haifa in Israel, linking the Mediterranean to its Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, once focused almost exclusively on the Gulf, are now projecting financial and political power across North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean.

The region has become a multipolar arena where the EU is a less relevant actor, with few tools of real influence. What was once Europe’s neighborhood laboratory is now an open chessboard where others move decisively while Brussels debates semantics.

Europe and the Lesson of Multivector Diplomacy

In the 1990s, the Mediterranean was the laboratory of European foreign policy. Today, it is the mirror of Europe’s impotence. While Brussels debates procedures, others consolidate military bases, networks of influence, and strategic alliances.

What can Europe do? First, it must accept that not everything is possible. The EU should prioritize realistic enlargements (Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) and abandon vague promises that only generate frustration. Second, it must decide whether to preserve an empty Mediterranean institutional framework or to relaunch it with clear objectives, measurable goals, and enforceable commitments. And third, most urgently, it must recognize that the Mediterranean is no longer politically calm, it is a frontline of hard geopolitics.

Here Azerbaijan’s experience can provide inspiration. In a multipolar world, President Ilham Aliyev’s multivector foreign policy shows how a Middle Power can expand its room for manoeuvre. Baku does not confine itself to one bloc: it builds bridges with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and Ankara while consolidating regional influence after the liberation of Karabakh and the opening of strategic corridors. This is a flexible, pragmatic policy centered on national interests.

Europe, by contrast, still behaves as if the world were bipolar or, at best, merely transatlantic. Its Mediterranean policy seems guided more by institutional inertia than by the current logic of power. While others combine alliances and move pieces with agility, Brussels remains trapped in often semantic debates about frameworks and declarations.

The commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Barcelona Process should serve as a wake-up call. Europe must stop being an impotent spectator and become an actor in its own neighbourhood. To do so, it needs less bureaucracy and more flexibility, fewer speeches and more real influence. The logic of the 21st century is not solemn declarations but strategic autonomy and pragmatic alliances.

If Europe does not learn this lesson, it risks being excluded as a relevant and respected actor in the rapidly reconfiguring world we are witnessing in real time. Its shrinking weight in the Mediterranean is a stark thermometer of an overdue adaptation to the emerging order, one governed by new logics and new rules.

Dr. Jordi Xuclà is a lawyer and professor of International Relations at Abad Oliba University in Barcelona (Spain). He served as senator and member of the Spanish parliament (2000–2019) and, among other roles, was a member of the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and the Union for the Mediterranean. He was also a member of the Committee for the Election of Judges of the European Court of Human Rights.

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