Has the United States really lost India?

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Under a photo showing Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—likely taken at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin—Donald Trump took to Truth Social on September 5 with a sarcastic but regretful post.

He claimed America had “lost India and Russia to China”, wishing them “a long and prosperous future together!”. Leaving Russia aside for now—that deserves a separate discussion—the main question is: Has Washington truly lost India?

For the past two decades, ties between India and the United States have been closer than ever before. The two countries established strong economic and strategic links, anchored in shared values like democracy and cultural diversity, and in a common concern about China’s rise. Washington bet on India as a central partner in the Indo-Pacific, to help it counter Beijing in the global great-power rivalry, especially to contain the PLA Navy in contested waters of the South China Sea and the vast India Ocean.

Since George W. Bush, successive U.S. presidents have worked to boost India’s capabilities, believing that would strengthen the rules-based international order (read: the “liberal international order”) in Asia. President Bush concluded the landmark U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement, or 123 Agreement, in 2008—a significant achievement given India’s status as a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Washington has since signaled its commitment to this framework by finalizing steps to remove regulatory barriers that have historically constrained civil nuclear cooperation with Indian firms. Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy announced in 2011 gave India a higher profile in the region. Joe Biden went even further, focusing on tech and defense cooperation, launching an ambitious plan to give India access to advanced U.S. technology, and strengthening military ties. He made the Quad—bringing together the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia—a key pillar of America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The Biden administration even overlooked India’s refusal to condemn Russia’s war in Ukraine and its acquisition of S-400 air defense systems, which under normal circumstances would have triggered sanctions under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

But over the past four months, the carefully nurtured U.S.-India relationship has gone off the rails. Trade talks collapsed despite months of negotiations. Relations soured further after Trump slapped 50% tariffs on Indian exports—higher than those on Chinese goods. The Trump administration initially imposed 25% tariffs, later adding another 25% as a punitive measure in response to India’s purchase of Russian oil. He even threatened to raise them to 100% and blasted India’s economic policies. In late July, Trump cut a deal with Pakistan—India’s long-time rival—under which Washington would help Islamabad develop its oil reserves.

From Washington’s perspective, this tough stance is a reaction to India’s continued imports of discounted Russian oil despite Western sanctions, as well as its wide-ranging geopolitical balancing (or diplomatic dancing, as a former Indian ambassador to the UAE said): staying in BRICS and the SCO, while still relying heavily on Russian arms. Modi, for his part, has stood firm—arguing that Russian oil is simply a commercial choice, which anyhow makes up up only a small fraction of India's overall imports, and that diversifying partners is a cornerstone of India’s foreign policy.

The implications of the rift between the United States and India are already clear. Oil markets are rattled. The foundation of the U.S.–India partnership is shaky. Anti-American sentiment in Indian foreign policy circles—once in decline—is making a comeback. And for Washington, the loss of India as a reliable partner in Asia is a serious setback in its contest with China.

At the same time, India is signaling warmer ties with China and Russia. Prime Minister Modi’s trip to Tianjin for the SCO summit on September 1, 2025—his first visit to China in seven years—was widely viewed as an attempt to repair relations with Beijing after the deadly 2020 border clashes. In a similar vein, just days before last year’s BRICS summit in Kazan, India and China signed a memorandum establishing joint patrols to help manage their border disputes. Modi has also confirmed that Putin will visit India later this year.

Looking ahead, the SCO is likely to deepen coordination among China, Russia, India, and other Asian states. That means faster progress on joint infrastructure and energy projects—reshaping regional power balances, boosting the group’s influence in international crises, and adding to the global challenge against Trump’s “America First” foreign policy.

There are other ripple effects too. When asked about the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), Trump described it as a “group of wonderful nations” joining forces to counter countries that harm the U.S. on trade. Yet Washington’s rift with New Delhi could undermine the project, giving China’s Belt and Road Initiative an even stronger advantage. And with U.S.–India ties fraying, Beijing has more room to tilt the regional balance in its favor—through loans, military agreements, and broader political influence. China is now more deeply involved in South Asia than ever before. Ironically, though, the shake-up might reduce rigid alliances and open the door to more stability across South Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

One thing seems certain; the rift between Washington and New Delhi isn’t going away anytime soon. It is more likely to grow into a complex geopolitical crisis. More important, the rift may have geopolitical implications that go beyond the U.S.-India relationship, including in the Gulf states, not least the UAE.

 

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