SCO at a Crossroads: Can Eurasia Overcome Political Rivalries to Build True Connectivity?

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin has drawn unprecedented attention. With the largest gathering in its history, the SCO now stands as one of the most significant multilateral platforms in Eurasia.

Yet the summit has also exposed deep-seated rivalries that undermine its stated mission of fostering regional security, economic integration, and mutual trust. The latest example is India’s decision to block Azerbaijan’s application for full membership—an act that reveals how geopolitical calculations can override the spirit of cooperation that the SCO seeks to embody.

The promise of Eurasian integration

At its core, the SCO was conceived as a forum to address regional security challenges and promote development through connectivity. It is no coincidence that many of its founding members now also participate in major infrastructure and energy projects designed to reshape Eurasia’s economic map. The organization has grown beyond its original Central Asian focus to include major powers like India and Pakistan, with dialogue partners extending to Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and other strategically placed nations along key transit routes.

The vision is clear: to create a Eurasian zone where trade corridors, energy pipelines, and digital networks tie countries together for mutual benefit. This vision aligns closely with China’s Global Governance Initiative (GGI) and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), both of which emphasize development through cooperative multilateralism rather than zero-sum competition. Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly urged SCO members to “see each other as partners, not rivals,” stressing that Eurasian prosperity depends on reducing mistrust and building shared institutions.

Blocking Azerbaijan: A self-defeating move

Against this backdrop, India’s recent decision to block Azerbaijan’s full membership has raised eyebrows. New Delhi has provided no convincing explanation for its veto. Some analysts point to India’s close defense and energy ties with Armenia, others to a desire to limit China’s influence in the South Caucasus. Whatever the reasoning, the move contradicts the SCO’s fundamental principle of inclusivity and mutual respect.

Azerbaijan is not an outsider seeking to disrupt regional harmony. On the contrary, it has demonstrated consistent commitment to multilateral diplomacy, energy cooperation, and cross-regional connectivity. Baku has played a pivotal role in the Middle Corridor—a critical east-west trade route linking China to Europe through Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. The proposed Zangezur Corridor, highlighted by President Ilham Aliyev at the SCO+ meeting, offers another strategic link between Asia and Europe, bypassing congested or unstable routes.

Aliyev’s remarks underscored Azerbaijan’s readiness to act as a bridge between regions, facilitating trade and reducing geopolitical friction. “Our geography gives us responsibility,” he said, emphasizing that Azerbaijan’s role in energy exports and transport infrastructure benefits not just itself but its partners across Eurasia. Blocking such a constructive actor from joining the SCO undermines the organization’s credibility as a platform for economic cooperation and security dialogue.

China’s vision versus regional rivalries

China has openly supported Azerbaijan’s bid, framing it within a broader call for reforming global and regional institutions. Through the GGI, Beijing has urged platforms like the SCO to move beyond outdated Cold War mentalities and resist being hijacked by unilateral agendas. In Xi Jinping’s view, Eurasia’s rise depends on functional multilateralism—where cooperation on trade, energy, climate, and security issues takes precedence over narrow political disputes.

This approach is consistent with China’s own practice. By expanding trade routes, offering development financing, and supporting dialogue among rival states, Beijing has positioned itself as a proponent of what it calls “win-win cooperation.” In contrast, India’s move risks reinforcing perceptions that the SCO could devolve into yet another arena for geopolitical competition, rather than a solution to it.

The irony is that both China and India stand to gain from a more connected Eurasia. Improved transit corridors would reduce shipping costs, diversify energy supplies, and strengthen regional value chains. A vibrant Middle Corridor passing through Azerbaijan is not a threat to Indian interests; it is an opportunity for India to access new markets and strengthen its own “Connect Central Asia” policy. Yet domestic politics and strategic mistrust appear to have taken precedence over economic logic.

What Azerbaijan brings to the table

Azerbaijan’s potential as an SCO member is considerable. Its geographic position at the crossroads of the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East makes it a natural hub for transport and energy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the Southern Gas Corridor, and new rail and port facilities on the Caspian Sea have already transformed Azerbaijan into a key player in European and Asian energy security.

Moreover, Baku has invested heavily in digital infrastructure and green energy initiatives, offering additional platforms for cooperation within the SCO framework. Its diplomatic record—including successful mediation in various regional disputes—demonstrates that Azerbaijan is not a spoiler but a stabilizer. The country’s pragmatic foreign policy allows it to maintain positive relations with diverse powers, from Russia and China to the European Union and Türkiye.

Aliyev’s call at the SCO+ meeting to deepen cooperation on transport corridors, energy diversification, and technology transfer reflects a forward-looking agenda aligned with the SCO’s long-term strategy. By excluding such a partner, the SCO risks narrowing its vision at precisely the moment when it needs to expand.

The cost of politicizing the SCO

India’s obstruction highlights a larger question: Can the SCO evolve into a genuinely effective multilateral institution, or will it remain hostage to bilateral rivalries among its members? The organization’s credibility depends on its ability to reconcile differences and deliver tangible benefits to its participants. If membership decisions are driven by political grudges rather than strategic considerations, the SCO may fail to fulfill its promise.

This is not merely a regional issue. Eurasia’s economic geography is shifting rapidly, with new transport routes and energy flows bypassing traditional chokepoints. The SCO has the potential to shape these developments in a cooperative way, ensuring that infrastructure investment leads to shared prosperity rather than competition. But doing so requires member states to prioritize collective goals over individual disputes.

China’s GGI provides a conceptual framework for such cooperation. It calls for reforming governance structures, empowering regional organizations, and creating development partnerships that avoid the pitfalls of zero-sum thinking. For the SCO, embracing this vision would mean treating membership applications—whether from Azerbaijan or other prospective states—not as battlegrounds for influence but as opportunities to strengthen the organization’s legitimacy and effectiveness.

A turning point for Eurasia

The Tianjin summit will be remembered not just for its size but for what it reveals about the SCO’s direction. Will it become a platform that embodies Eurasia’s collective aspirations, or will it remain constrained by national vetoes and rivalries?

Azerbaijan’s exclusion is a test case. If constructive actors willing to contribute to regional stability and connectivity are kept out for political reasons, the SCO risks undermining its own mission. Conversely, embracing inclusivity would send a powerful signal that Eurasia’s future lies in cooperation rather than confrontation.

The world is watching. As global institutions struggle to adapt to new power dynamics, regional organizations like the SCO have an opportunity to fill the gap. But they can only succeed if they rise above parochialism and commit to building genuine partnerships.

Azerbaijan has already demonstrated its readiness to play such a role. It is now up to the SCO—and particularly to those members who wield veto power—to decide whether they will match that readiness with vision. The alternative is to allow narrow interests to erode an institution that was created to transcend them.

Eurasia stands at a crossroads. The choice is between building corridors of trade, energy, and dialogue—or reinforcing barriers of mistrust. The SCO’s response to Azerbaijan’s candidacy will show which path its members are willing to take.

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