Meeting in Washington - a lesson of realism

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Monday, August 18th, 2025, may already be marked as a historical date and qualified as a beginning of the end of the war in Ukraine. In simplest terms, what happened during the White House meeting is that three out of four parties agreed that a territorial cession is an acceptable price for peace.

This means that the conflict will be resolved along the current frontline. At the same time, in all other senses – strategically, economically and ideologically – the end of war is a beginning of a new order, and not only in Ukraine, in all of Europe and globally.

Lessons from history

Historically, the examples of West Germany, Japan, and other state show that territorial integrity is not actually a to-be-or-not-to-be of a successful statehood. Modernization, security and strength may be achieved despite territorial losses and sometimes, the latter serves as motivation to reach those goals. On the other hand – occupying other nation’s territory may very often become a burden that undermines international and internal position of an occupier. This is not to say that losing territory, especially after being invaded and fighting a bloody war, is something positive. However, there are things worse than that, and trading 20% of the land in exchange for securing full control over 80% of the territory is a chance for a new beginning. As Alexander Stubb mentioned in his comment right after the meeting in the White House — referring to the history of his country — being Russia’s neighbor requires hard decisions. But a right territorial decision, made at the right time, may secure a future that continued war will not.

Every leader participated in the Washington meeting with their own agenda, and the way it underwent and finished gives space to summarize – if not their actual achievements (those will be clear after the ceasefire conditions are defined during the upcoming meeting with Putin), at least of their intentions.

Ukraine’s position

Ukraine’s consent to a territorial concession in exchange for peace marks an existential turning point. The country would no longer be able to fight for its territorial integrity and therefore has to bitterly accept a new territorial reality and prepare for a post-war existence, one full of strategic, political, economic, and social challenges. But one thing must be emphasized: there will be a post-war Ukraine, and this alone may be qualified as Kyiv’s great success, given that Moscow’s main objective was, and still is, the complete annihilation of its sovereignty.

Russia’s position

By accepting a ceasefire that freezes the conflict, Russia acknowledges, although conditionally and likely temporarily, Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state. Interestingly, from Moscow’s perspective, this constitutes a major strategic, ideological and geopolitical failure. By fighting this war, Kyiv broke Moscow’s zero-sum perception of Russian-Ukrainian relations, proving that the parallel existence of the two states as sovereign entities is not merely a theoretical possibility but an established fact. Putin’s readiness to sign a ceasefire with Ukraine amounts to Russia’s acceptance of its existence – something this war was designed and fought to prevent. To reach its goals, Russia had to win the war, while Ukraine merely had to avoid defeat. A compromise between two countries, including one involving territory, is more favorable to Ukraine than it is to Russia.

American position

The American position during the meeting was based on a business-led logic rather than one driven by geopolitics or values. Neither America’s own existence nor its security is at stake in this conflict. Therefore, Washington may treat the war, as well as its participants, as instruments for calibration of its interests. Donald Trump very frankly demonstrated that every state is pursuing its own interests, and those interests - not values or anything else – define the criteria of success and failure. Every leader is responsible for their own country, while other countries and alliances serve as means rather than ends. The decision of how and for how long to support Ukraine is a sovereign prerogative of the U.S. President, determined solely by his interpretation of American national interests — not by external pressures or abstract principles. If the ‘deal’ negotiated with Russia is more appealing than fighting for Ukraine’s integrity, the rest of the world, including Kyiv, has little choice but to accept this fact and adjust accordingly. The application of business logic to world politics may be problematic to accept for nations and politicians led by a geopolitical or moral agenda – but it is at the very least it’s logically coherent. And finally, it brings not only a disillusionment about what America truly is, but — if accepted and internalized — also new opportunities. Within this logic, if someone one day offers Trump a better deal than Putin did, he will most likely leave Moscow empty-handed.

How does Europe view the meetings?

European leaders present at the meeting also seemed to understand and accept the fundamental character of the historical moment. The war in Ukraine is a symptom and catalyst – not a reason – of major continental strategic shifts. If not in Ukraine, these would have happened anyway, manifesting in other places and ways, because they are a product of fundamental structural forces, much more powerful than the logic of relations between Russia and Ukraine. The old ‘post-biopolar’ order in Europe has come to an end and the war demonstrates that Europe neither functions nor will function according to the old structures and dynamics. To put it in geopolitical terms: Europe’s eastern border — politically, economically, culturally, and strategically — must finally be defined after more than 30 years of transition. Russia is not, and does not wish to be, part of Europe. Moreover, for internal reasons, Moscow positions itself as an anti-Europe. This means that Russia will not become more European, nor Europe will not be more Russian, therefore a border between the two must be established. One of the crucial elements in separating Europe from Russia is defining the status of the post-Soviet countries located in between. This will not be a unilateral process. Russia showed itself incapable of establishing its zone of ‘privileged responsibility’ by economic, ideological, and – as the war with Ukraine demonstrated – also by military means. Russia was unable to transform its vision of Eastern Europe, proposed by Sergey Lavrov in December 2021 right before the invasion, into reality. This means that Eastern Europe, including the precise location of a border between ‘West’ and ‘East’ will be defined by both sides, exactly what European leaders were trying to negotiate in the White House. The civilizational, economic, cultural and strategic affiliation of Ukraine remains an open question at the top of Europe-Russia relations’ agenda in the years to come. Yes, Putin managed to occupy 20% of Ukrainian territory, but the future of the rest doesn’t depend on Russia, at least not entirely.

Conclusion

The White House meeting was just a round of a longer and complicated game – it didn’t start with Donald Trump and will not end with him. International order is not a fixed ‘state’ of affairs, but rather a fluid ‘process’. The external conditions shaping Ukrainian statehood and nationhood form a framework within which Ukrainians maintain a level of strategic flexibility. While it is narrower than before, it is still available.

Ukraine remains a subject of European policy, and Ukrainians remain subjects of their own state — even though the very aim of the war was to eliminate both Ukraine’s international agency and the national self-determination of its people. The border between Europe and Russia is currently under construction, and the place of Ukraine in this new continental order remains in play. Vladimir Putin would like to decide it, but he can’t. Donald Trump could decide it, but he doesn’t want to. Europeans neither can nor want to do so. These are the frames inside which Ukrainians may act to form their own future.

The White House meeting didn’t make the occupation of Ukraine more legal or moral, but at least it put limits to it. From now on, the focus of discussion shifts from how to wage the war to how to end it. The game between Europe, the U.S., and Russia in and around Ukraine will go on, but under this new logic, everyone whose life is saved may be considered a winner of the White House meeting. The new logic is to pursue the game by means other than war, which may be considered a value in itself.

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