Hegemony Construction and the South Caucasus: Between “Giants” and “Aspirants”

The South Caucasus—comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—has long been a geopolitical crossroads where regional and global powers intersect.

The collapse of the Soviet Union after 1991 unlocked this volatile yet strategically vital region to competing hegemonic projects. Surrounded by a resurgent Russia, assertive Türkiye and Iran, an ambitious China, and Western-backed actors including the US and Israel, the region's future will depend on how these forces construct, clash over, and negotiate their visions of regional order. At stake are not only resources and transit corridors, but also normative models of governance and integration, as well as human-focused cultural and societal transformations.

Russia: A Historical Authority in Decline?

Russia's grip over the South Caucasus has been foundational. From Tsarist annexation to Soviet collectivization and post-1991 interventionism, it is no secret that Moscow considers the region its "near abroad". This is not only due to historical and cultural ties, but also because the South Caucasus serves as a cornerstone of its strategic depth due to the changing political and economic dynamics. Yet, according to analysts, based in leading Western academic centres, there is one inescapable outcome of the coming decades: the erosion of Russian hegemony. The war in Ukraine, economic pressures, shifting public perceptions shaped by digital media, as well as declining soft power, compared to early years of Putin’s presidency, are commonly cited as key reasons explaining Russia's diminishing influence.

Nevertheless, Russia's military presence—particularly in Armenia, Georgia’s breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia—remains potent. Its traditional tools of influence include pro-Russian elites, disinformation, anti-Western sentiments and partially Orthodox solidarity. But with regional actors diversifying their alignments, Russia must now negotiate its role rather than dictate it.

Despite recent setbacks for Russia, it is vital to maintain a multidimensional perspective: Russian traditional power is not limited to military strength or hard power. Regardless of the decline in its soft-power image-building tactics, Russia continues to use ongoing conflicts in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and most recently in Iran - supported by the Western backed coalition, to frame its diplomacy around “peace” and “international law” narratives. However, similarly tragic developments have continued in Ukraine for more than three years.

Consequently, in this process, where Russian hegemony seems to be “under reconstruction”, the actors of the South Caucasus need to pursue skilful, non-unilateral and moderate diplomacy to maintain the balance in their relations with Russia.

US-Israeli Strategic Projection: How to Blend “Devastating Hard Power” with “Soft-Smart Power” Tools?

The US and Israel pursue parallel but complementary strategies in the South Caucasus. For Washington, the region represents a frontier against “anti-Western”, “anti-US” or “anti-Israel” resurgence, in addition to constituting a vital corridor for energy independence from Russia, and a “testbed for liberal institutionalism”.

Since the end of the Cold War, American policy—often channelled through NATO partnerships, democracy assistance, and economic aid— has aimed to prevent any single hegemon from dominating the region. However, it could be argued that, in light of recent destructive uses of hard-power- starting from the Middle East and affecting all Eurasia- the US has continued to act along some “unilateral” and “hegemonic” lines, rather than through the multilateral, liberal and institutional frameworks.

Thus, the decline of most global institutions, such as the United Nations, illustrates the main dilemma today. This decline is compounded by the ongoing pressure on the personnel, diplomats and highest representatives of this organization, exerted by the US and its allies. And this dilemma is not exclusive to the US, but also for many “Western” actors.

Meanwhile, sometimes Israel operates through “quieter” channels, including deep military cooperation, intelligence sharing, and arms exports. While less invested in normative governance, and despite limited humanitarian focus- justified by the emphasis on security -Israel's pragmatism aligns with US interests in counterbalancing Iran and Russia regionally; and, eventually, China on a global scale.

Hence, together, this dual influence represents a unique model of hegemony: not based on territorial control, but on interdependent networks of military aid, ideology, individual freedoms, prosperity and diplomacy. However, this model may be constrained by geographical distance and inconsistency in engagement—creating a space for more proximate powers to contest their leverage.

Furthermore, the digital sphere- developed through the last 20 years mostly by American, Western and Israeli entrepreneurs- ironically has already become a powerful vehicle for voices critical of the West. In this realm every second a new humanitarian catastrophe becomes easily visible, as demonstrated by discussions stemming from the Palestinian front for nearly two years. In this context, the actors in the South Caucasus should avoid being “too neutral” or “too silent” to such humanitarian crises of our last decades, in order to build a more legitimate and ethical future for their new roles.

Türkiye and Iran: Strategic Rivals but Civilizational Twins

Türkiye and Iran are historic empires with competing strategic interests in the South Caucasus. Their rivalry is driven as much by culture and soft power as by pipelines and diplomacy. Türkiye has dramatically expanded its influence in the South Caucasus after 2020, due to Ankara’s ties with Baku. It is now focused on the idea of a "Turkic world", from Anatolia to Central Asia/Turkestan, with Baku being an important part of this framework. Multilateral, peaceful and diplomatic institutions- like Organization of Turkic States - have been a significant pillar of Turkish foreign policy in the region for at least 15 years.

Meanwhile, Iran feels encircled. Despite religious similarities with Azerbaijan, Tehran views Baku's ties with Israel and Ankara's rising influence with suspicion. Iran also maintains a quiet but firm relationship with Armenia, serving as a counterweight in regional alignments.

Yet, Iran’s cultural and historical soft power and “backdoor channels” that also include footprints of the pre-Revolutionary Iranian influence must not be underestimated. With its advantageous position of thousands-years of unchanged and unshakable borders, Iran is far from a “small” and “easy target” portrayed by certain Israeli and American military figures or far-right politicians—statements often reflecting Orientalist or culturally biased undertones.

Both Türkiye and Iran are pragmatic actors. They avoid direct conflict while competing for influence through economic interdependence, humanitarian and cultural contacts, religious institutions, as well as infrastructure projects. Their competition is moderated by mutual recognition of each other's historical weight and by the costs of overt confrontation. In this framework their strategic calculations for the South Caucasus will remain relational, not absolute.

China: The Moderate Giant and the Silk Road Re-imagined

China's presence in the South Caucasus is subtle but strategic. It avoids security entanglements, instead advancing its vision through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), infrastructure financing, and economic diplomacy. Georgia and Azerbaijan are key nodes in China's trans-Eurasian ambitions, linking the Caspian Sea to Europe via rail corridors and port development.

Beijing's appeal lies in its non-interventionist ethos: it offers capital without conditions. This contrasts sharply with the political strings attached to Western aid or the military risks tied to Russian patronage. China's "moderate" hegemonic posture aligns better with the fragmented landscape of the South Caucasus, as it promises modernization without polarization. This also explains why the “Marco Polo spirit”, which once flowed from Europe to Eurasia and China in the 13th century, will be revitalized in the coming decades with the inclusion of new actors.

Certainly, internal democratic dilemmas, deep and historical domestic issues inside the vast lands of China, and the unsolved problems in East Asia may pose obstacles for the new model of Chinese “hegemony”. Yet, at least for now, China’s position can be broadly characterized by the principle that “moderation is not weakness”. Chinese technology, investment, and connectivity projects are building long-term dependencies. While Beijing has no interest in overt control, its economic presence, combined with its respect for cultural and humanitarian legacies, may shape the development trajectories in the South Caucasus in profound ways—especially as Western and Russian influence vacillate.

Conclusion: Contested Hegemonies, Conditional Futures

The South Caucasus is not defined by a single “hegemony” but by layered constructions of influences. Russia's legacy, the US-Israel axis, the Turkish-Iranian rivalry, and China's patient entry collectively shape a pluralistic yet precarious order. Local actors—especially Azerbaijan and Armenia—are no longer passive recipients but active players. They seek to leverage these competing interests to maximize sovereignty, capacity, and prestige.

As a result, for the South Caucasus, the challenge is not just “choosing sides” but thriving—in a world of multiple competing influences. This explains the lack of a clear-cut hierarchy; instead, the region operates through the mix of balancing, bandwagoning, and bargaining. Influence here is fluid: constructed less through domination and more through the accumulation of trust, strategic utility, and coercive capacity.

Instead of outdated modernist and militaristic notions of hierarchy rooted in the wars of 19th and 20th centuries, a new post-modern style of hegemony or counter-hegemony may emerge. This form may better reshape the region in accordance with the desires of emerging “digitalized” generations and economies.

Dr. Melih Demirtaş, Political Analyst/Researcher, Ankara

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