Chinese pragmatism, U.S. unpredictability: What’s left for the UN?

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The recent meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Washington was presented with all the symbolism of a major encounter between two global powers.

Beneath the military ceremony, presidential hospitality and carefully choreographed warmth, the summit revealed something more significant than a temporary easing of U.S.-China tensions: the growing importance of pragmatic, transactional diplomacy in an international system where the credibility of traditional power centres is increasingly contested.

Xi Jinping’s decision to travel to Washington while not personally attending the United Nations General Assembly in New York was also particularly revealing. At a moment when the UN was attempting to address wars, artificial intelligence, climate change and the erosion of confidence in multilateral institutions, the Chinese president chose “not to honour UN” in its most substantial yearly event; instead, he devoted his attention to direct negotiations with the American president.

However, this non-attendance might not surely mean that China has abandoned multilateralism; on the contrary, Beijing continues to use the UN and other international institutions to advance its positions on sovereignty, non-interference and international law. At the same time, China is strengthening other multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. A short while ago at the September BRICS summit in New Delhi, where the UN Secretary-General Guterres was also present, Xi described the collective rise of the “Global South” as a major driver of world multipolarity and called for stronger cooperation among developing countries.

The contrast is therefore not simply between multilateralism and bilateralism. China increasingly operates through both. Thus we may argue, Chinese pragmatism is becoming increasingly effective in a fragmented international system because Beijing has learned to move and fluctuate simultaneously and skilfully across several diplomatic arenas and crises.

Xi in Washington: When the White House takes centre stage

Xi’s last visit to the U.S. between 23-25 September was remarkable not merely because of its political significance, but also because of its choreography. Trump personally welcomed Xi, while the two leaders subsequently held talks at the White House and attended a lavish state dinner surrounded by prominent figures from the American technology and business establishment. The summit produced limited agreements on trade and continued dialogue on technology and strategic issues.

The imagery was also deliberately contradictory. On one side stood the formal institutions of diplomacy: the UN General Assembly, international law and multilateral negotiations. On the other stood two presidents negotiating pragmatically on the issues, directly affecting “the future of humanity” over tariffs, technology, strategic competition and regional crises.

The substance was nevertheless more limited than the symbolism. Washington and Beijing agreed on reciprocal tariff reductions covering roughly $30 billion of non-sensitive goods from each side, while extending the existing trade truce. Nonetheless, some strategic questions involving Taiwan and Iran, technology and critical minerals seem to remain substantially up in the air.

But that may itself be an expression of Chinese pragmatism, because Beijing does not necessarily need a grand strategic agreement with Washington, which appears to be in the process of losing credibility amid several high-scale tensions around the world. Thus, Xi and his cadre can benefit from a temporary reduction in tensions, preserve economic predictability and continue negotiating on issues where interests overlap while keeping its fundamental strategic positions intact.

An additional significant point appears here, therefore, as China does not necessarily need to construct a formal anti-American alliance. It can instead cultivate overlapping institutions in which different states cooperate on different issues. Thus, apart from some other considerable actors in “non-Western world politics”, like, first of all, Russia, which tends to act with visible and mostly unilateral strategic interests, China continues to keep its aims increasingly “negotiable” and “adaptable” to rapidly changing circumstances.

When Silicon Valley sits at the diplomatic table

The symbolism of the latest visit became even clearer at the White House state dinner. Elon Musk, Jensen Huang, Sam Altman, Tim Cook, Sundar Pichai, Jeff Bezos, Mark Zuckerberg and other leading figures from the technology and business world were among the invited guests. Such a kind of dinner therefore represented more than diplomatic hospitality. It placed political leadership and technological power around the same table at precisely the moment when artificial intelligence, semiconductors, rare earths and technology standards are becoming central instruments of geopolitical competition of the new age.

Therefore, we may rightly argue that traditional diplomatic tables are changing. In previous centuries, great-power diplomacy was primarily conducted by presidents, foreign ministers, ambassadors and military officials. In this new century, definitely the CEOs of technology companies increasingly occupy part of the same strategic space.

Accordingly, the new kind of disputes demonstrates that 21st-century great-power competition is not fought only through military alliances or weapons systems. It is also fought through supply chains, technology, critical minerals and access to markets. Thus, pragmatism does not necessarily mean compromise on everything - it can mean “creating new tables” and “compartmentalising disagreements”.

Iran and Taiwan: “The weakest links” in the pragmatism of two giants

The most revealing question is therefore not whether China and the United States can cooperate. Clearly, they can. The more difficult question is where cooperation stops. Iran and Taiwan provide two particularly important examples. For Washington, Iran has demonstrated the limits of translating military superiority into sustainable political outcomes. Coercive capabilities do not automatically produce rapid diplomatic settlements. The U.S. may possess extraordinary military and technological power, but the political consequences of using that power can remain difficult to control.

For Beijing, Taiwan represents a different kind of limitation. China’s diplomacy can be remarkably flexible when dealing with trade, investment and economic relations. But Taiwan remains a substantial historical issue on which Beijing has established much more rigid strategic red lines. China continues to oppose Taiwanese independence and American arms sales to Taipei, while Washington continues to maintain its commitments to Taiwan. This demonstrates an important characteristic of Chinese pragmatism: Pragmatism must not necessarily mean neutrality. It means distinguishing between what can be negotiated and what cannot. The same contradiction applies to Iran. Beijing maintains important economic and diplomatic relations with Tehran, while Washington continues to view Chinese relations with Iran through the lens of sanctions and regional security.

Thus, both Washington and Beijing have their own “weakest links”. America’s difficulty lies in converting military and economic power into predictable political outcomes. China’s lies in the fact that its pragmatism has limits when questions of sovereignty and territorial claims touch its core strategic interests. The emerging relationship between the two powers is therefore less a strategic partnership than “managed rivalry”: cooperation where necessary, competition where unavoidable, and continued communication designed to prevent disputes from becoming uncontrollable.

The American “credibility problem”: power without predictability

The discussion of declining U.S. credibility should not be confused with the disappearance of American power. It remains a major military, technological and financial centre of the world, but the more important issue appears to be predictability.

International credibility depends not only on the capacity to impose costs, but also on whether other states believe that commitments, rules and diplomatic positions will remain sufficiently stable over time. The Trump-Xi summit illustrated this tension. The same U.S. administration can threaten tariffs, negotiate tariff reductions, discuss Iran, maintain commitments regarding Taiwan, promote AI cooperation and host the Chinese president at a highly symbolic state dinner.

China, meanwhile, can resist American pressure on issues it regards as fundamental while simultaneously negotiating intensely over trade and economic access. This is transactional diplomacy. But when the world’s largest powers increasingly treat international relations as a sequence of transactions, the question becomes what happens to the rules that are supposed to exist beyond those transactions.

Artificial intelligence illustrates this contradiction particularly well. Washington and Beijing are competing for technological leadership while simultaneously recognising the need for communication over AI-related risks. Economic interdependence and strategic rivalry therefore coexist rather than replace one another. The same applies to critical minerals and supply chains. The traditional distinction between economics and security is increasingly disappearing.

What is left for the UN?

This may ultimately be the most important question. If Washington increasingly prioritises bilateral bargaining, if Beijing combines pragmatic great-power relations with alternative multilateral platforms, and if more belligerent sides, like Moscow, continue to challenge Western interpretations of international institutions, where does that leave the United Nations?

The answer should not be that the UN has become irrelevant. Indeed, the very problems confronting the international system demonstrate why it remains necessary.

China itself continues to defend the language of sovereignty, equality and multilateralism within the UN. At the same time, Beijing is investing diplomatic energy in BRICS and the SCO. At both forums, Chinese diplomacy has presented multipolarity not as the abandonment of the UN but as an argument for reforming global governance and increasing the representation of the Global South. Chinese pragmatism is increasingly effective because American (and also Russian) credibility is being questioned in many parts of the world. But that does not automatically make Beijing’s model an alternative and the most “ideal” international order. Nor does declining confidence in Washington make transactional politics a sustainable substitute for multilateral diplomacy.

Between declining American power and rising Chinese pragmatism, the real challenge for the coming years will therefore lie in how to preserve a diplomatic system in which neither power—and no great power—can define the rules entirely according to its own interests. That is precisely why the UN, despite all its weaknesses, remains indispensable. The future of international diplomacy may ultimately depend not on whether China replaces America, but on whether a fragmented international system can prevent competition among leading powers from becoming a substitute for the rules that are supposed to govern and humanise them.

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