The Chokepoint War: How the Iran Conflict Is Redrawing the Maritime Map

The AnewZ Opinion section provides a platform for independent voices to share expert perspectives on global and regional issues. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official position of AnewZ

When the South Korean container ship PanStar Acro left Busan for Europe through the Arctic in August, its voyage seemed far removed from the war between the United States, Israel and Iran. In reality, the two developments are increasingly connected. 

South Korea's first commercial test of the Northern Sea Route follows China's move from experimental sailings towards a regular seasonal container service along the same Arctic corridor.

The attraction is obvious. By sailing north along Russia's Arctic coast rather than south through the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, ships connecting East Asia with northern Europe can avoid several of the world's most vulnerable maritime passages. The route remains seasonal, technically demanding and politically dependent on cooperation with Moscow. It is nowhere close to replacing the Suez Canal. But the geopolitical significance of these experiments may be greater than their present commercial importance.

Six months of war with Iran have demonstrated how much global trade still depends on a remarkably small number of narrow waterways. Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez, Malacca and Gibraltar form different parts of the maritime system connecting the Gulf, Asia and Europe. The war has not affected all of them equally. But it has changed their strategic value - and, more importantly, revealed how dependent they are on one another.

The old chokepoints are not disappearing. What is emerging is a search for ways around them.

Hormuz: From Vulnerability to Battlefield

The Strait of Hormuz offers the clearest example. Before the war, approximately 21 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum liquids passed through it each day, alongside about one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, oil flows fell from an average of 21.6 million barrels per day in the final quarter of 2025 to 4.9 million in the second quarter of 2026.

For decades, Iran warned that a major conflict could lead it to close Hormuz. The conventional assumption was that the United States, with its overwhelming naval superiority, could eventually reopen it. The current war has complicated that assumption.

Iran has shown that it does not need to occupy or physically seal the strait permanently to disrupt it. Missiles, drones, attacks on vessels, rising insurance costs and uncertainty can sharply reduce commercial traffic even while the waterway remains technically navigable. Conversely, Washington can degrade Iranian naval capabilities and claim greater control over Hormuz without immediately restoring normal shipping.

Flows have recovered to some degree, although estimates differ because some vessels operate without normal tracking signals. Traffic nevertheless remains far below pre-war levels. This distinction between military control and commercial usability may be one of the war's most important lessons.

Hormuz has therefore evolved from an Iranian deterrent threat into an arena of strategic competition. What began as a campaign focused primarily on Iran's nuclear and missile capabilities has increasingly become a struggle over access to the waterway itself.

Bab el-Mandeb and Suez: Connected, but Not Inseparable

The second lesson comes from the Red Sea. Bab el-Mandeb and Suez are geographically separate, but commercially they often function as parts of the same route. A ship travelling from the Indian Ocean towards Europe normally enters the Red Sea through Bab el-Mandeb before reaching Suez. The canal can therefore remain completely open while losing much of its strategic usefulness.

Houthi attacks demonstrated precisely this after 2023. Shipping companies diverted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope rather than risk Bab el-Mandeb, sharply reducing traffic through Suez without anyone attacking the canal itself. Some major operators have since begun a cautious, partial return to the Red Sea and Suez, but security concerns remain.

The Iran war has made the Red Sea route considerably more important, but not every chokepoint along it carries the same exposure. Saudi Arabia can reroute crude from its eastern oilfields through the East-West Pipeline to Yanbu, bypassing Hormuz. From there, oil destined for Europe can move north through the Suez Canal or Egypt's SUMED pipeline without crossing Bab el-Mandeb. Cargoes taking the direct route from Yanbu towards Asian markets, however, must travel south through Bab el-Mandeb, leaving them exposed to Houthi disruption.

The result is not a simple transfer of vulnerability from Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb. The Saudi alternative instead illustrates the growing value of route diversification: different destinations expose the same oil to different chokepoints. Strategic advantage increasingly belongs not to the state controlling one passage, but to those capable of avoiding it.

Malacca: The Other Side of Hormuz

The Strait of Malacca has not been a battlefield in this war. Yet it may offer one of its most important global lessons. Under normal conditions, Malacca carries more oil than Hormuz and serves as the principal maritime corridor linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimated that 23.2 million barrels per day passed through it in the first half of 2025. China accounted for 48 per cent of the import volumes using the strait.

Hormuz and Malacca should not, however, be viewed separately. Much of the Gulf oil destined for China, Japan and South Korea must pass through both. A disruption at Hormuz therefore reduces the volume of Middle Eastern crude reaching Asian buyers and reverberates downstream through Malacca, even when Malacca itself remains perfectly open.

For China, this reinforces the longstanding 'Malacca dilemma': its economic power remains dependent on maritime corridors that Beijing does not fully control. The war has therefore validated years of Chinese investment in strategic oil reserves, pipelines from Russia and Central Asia, renewable energy and alternative trade corridors. The Arctic route should be understood in this context.

The Arctic Alternative

A container travelling from East Asia to northern Europe through the Northern Sea Route can avoid Malacca, the Indian Ocean, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez altogether. Depending on its destination, it may also avoid Gibraltar. That does not make the Arctic a substitute for Hormuz: Gulf oil still has to leave the Gulf. Nor can the Northern Sea Route currently absorb more than a tiny fraction of Asia-Europe trade. But strategy is partly about creating options.

China has begun regular seasonal container services through the Arctic, while South Korea is testing the commercial viability of the same route and considering more regular links in the future. South Korean authorities estimate that the Arctic passage could cut voyage times by about 35 per cent on some Asia-Europe journeys.

The irony is significant. As instability makes the southern maritime corridor less predictable, climate change is making a northern corridor more accessible. But diversification does not eliminate geopolitics. It relocates it.

The traditional Asia-Europe route passes through waterways where U.S. naval power and Western allies have historically exercised substantial influence. The Northern Sea Route instead runs largely along the Russian Arctic coast and depends on Russian infrastructure, regulation and political consent. Reducing dependence on Suez and Malacca could therefore increase dependence on Moscow and deepen the emerging Russia-China partnership in the Arctic.

Tags

News Politics USA Iran Hormuz