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On 1 September 2026, the Non-Aligned Movement marked the 65th anniversary of its first conference. Belgrade once again hosted a high-level commemorative gathering at the movement's birthplace.
The symbolism remains striking. The movement's founding leaders are long gone. One of its founding states, Yugoslavia, no longer exists. The international order has been transformed more than once. Yet NAM persists and continues to attract the attention of countries seeking room for manoeuvre outside the power politics of great states.
NAM emerged from the Cold War divide and from the determination of newly independent, mostly post-colonial countries to build political and economic systems without foreign interference. Its members wanted to avoid bloc politics that could exhaust fragile states and endanger their development.
Its guiding principles - sovereign equality, non-interference, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for international obligations and cooperation in mutual interest - remain relevant in an international system in which major powers frequently put strategic advantage and self-preservation before the needs of less powerful countries.
The question today is not whether NAM can recreate Cold War neutrality. It is whether the movement can convert its size, experience and political diversity into meaningful agency for the Global South.
During the Cold War, NAM offered a political home to countries unwilling to align formally with either of the blocs led by the world's dominant powers. Its members were never perfectly neutral. Many developed close relations with one side or the other, and several conflicts occurred between NAM states. Even so, the movement created a distinct diplomatic space in which governments could defend their independence rather than accept a predetermined place in a superpower rivalry.
The end of the East-West ideological confrontation blurred that role. As the bipolar order crumbled, NAM entered a period of uncertainty and even faced calls for dissolution. The movement responded by broadening its agenda, with disarmament, development and cooperation among countries of the Global South becoming more prominent points of common purpose.
The post-Cold War period initially produced an unofficial US-led unipolar order. Today, China's rise and the emergence of several centres of power have brought the question of alignment back into international politics. The choice is no longer as neat as it was during the Cold War, but pressure on states to select strategic, technological and economic camps is becoming more visible.
This has given NAM a renewed opening. The movement's agenda now extends well beyond its original political concerns to include debt, trade, development finance, food and energy security, climate change and access to technology. Africa forms NAM's largest regional bloc, and many of its members face acute development and financial pressures. For the movement to remain relevant, it must continue to address those practical needs rather than rely on historical symbolism.
Climate policy and artificial intelligence should also move closer to the centre of NAM's work. Many member states are among those most exposed to environmental degradation while also facing the widest digital and technological gaps. A movement that speaks for strategic autonomy cannot ignore the infrastructure, skills and rules that will shape autonomy in the digital age.
South-South cooperation therefore remains one of NAM's most important commitments. At its best, such cooperation is more horizontal than traditional donor-recipient models and more attentive to the experience of developing states. It can support the exchange of technical knowledge, institutional expertise and development solutions without treating poorer countries as passive beneficiaries.
It would nevertheless be naive to assume that South-South cooperation is automatically free of national interest or political conditions. All states pursue interests. NAM's stronger argument is not that its members are uniquely altruistic, but that they can create wider choice, more equal partnerships and greater bargaining power for countries that would otherwise negotiate alone.
Although NAM's role is more diffuse than it was during the Cold War, its members still need forums capable of recognising their concerns and amplifying their voices in an international order dominated by major powers.
The growing number of middle powers from the Global South is changing international politics. These countries generally have little interest in overturning the existing order. They seek to extract more benefit from it, protect their autonomy and avoid excessive dependence on either Western or Chinese power.
This strategy is usually described as hedging or multi-alignment. It is less about standing at an equal distance from every major power than about cooperating with different partners on different issues. In a fragmented world, that flexibility has become a source of influence.
Several important middle powers are closely connected to NAM. Indonesia and South Africa are members, while Brazil participates as an observer. Azerbaijan, increasingly described as an emerging middle power, gave the movement unusual diplomatic visibility during its chairmanship from 2019 until the handover to Uganda in January 2024.
These states can strengthen NAM's role as a platform for reforming the international system. They possess regional influence, diplomatic networks and growing economic weight, but they also share an interest in preserving freedom of action. Their rise reinforces a principle that has always been central to non-alignment: strategic autonomy.
With 121 member states, NAM remains the largest grouping of states after the United Nations. It lacks the institutional depth of a formal international organisation, but it still provides a rare forum for countries whose interests are often underrepresented in global decision-making.
Some analysts have proposed terms such as 'active non-alignment' or even a 'multi-alignment movement' to describe this new reality. The semantic debate is less important than the underlying shift. Non-alignment no longer means political passivity or isolation. It can mean active engagement with multiple centres of power without surrendering the right to make independent choices.
Emerging middle powers therefore offer NAM much-needed flexibility and political weight. But their influence will benefit the movement only if it is used to advance common priorities rather than simply to magnify their own national agendas.
NAM's scale is impressive, but numbers alone do not produce collective power. Its members differ sharply in political systems, security relationships, economic interests and foreign-policy priorities. Consensus protects smaller states from domination, but it can also reduce ambitious initiatives to broad declarations.
The movement's deliberately light structure creates another constraint. NAM has no permanent secretariat; the country holding the chairmanship is responsible for coordinating its affairs. That informality preserves flexibility, yet it also weakens institutional memory, follow-through and the ability to turn political commitments into sustained programmes.
NAM does not need to imitate the European Union, NATO or another highly institutionalised body. Its diversity makes such models unrealistic. It does, however, need enough capacity to define priorities, coordinate expertise and measure whether decisions are implemented.
Without that capacity, anniversary meetings and summit communiques risk becoming rituals rather than instruments of influence. The movement's relevance will ultimately be judged by what it can deliver for its members between summits.
Countries around the world continue to value NAM as a platform for those unwilling to align completely with any dominant power. As most of its members belong to the Global South, the movement is increasingly understood as a vehicle for South-South cooperation, development and collective bargaining.
Its practical agenda should concentrate on areas where broad agreement is possible: reform of the United Nations and international financial institutions, sovereign debt, climate finance, food and energy security, fair access to artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure, and the transfer of technology and skills.
A stronger institutional framework would help. A modest permanent secretariat or technical unit could preserve continuity between chairmanships. A concise charter could clarify the movement's modern purpose, while an independent development or project facility could give practical substance to cooperation among members. Such reforms would not turn NAM into a bloc. They would give it the tools to act more consistently as a movement.
The need for better representation of less powerful countries has not disappeared. Nor has the appeal of strategic autonomy. If anything, renewed great-power competition, technological fragmentation and economic coercion have made those concerns more urgent.
At 65, NAM's central challenge is no longer survival. It is effectiveness. The movement still matters because the demand it represents remains real: the demand for states to cooperate widely, defend their independence and shape international rules rather than merely receive them.
In a world that is again pressuring countries to choose sides, NAM's most valuable promise is the right to choose without being chosen for.
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