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A Russian strike on a farm warehouse in Pryluky, north-central Ukraine, has killed at least three people, local police said. Meanwhile, EU foreign ...
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When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrated its 59th anniversary on August 8 in Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, the occasion offered more than an opportunity to reflect on nearly six decades of regional integration.
The ceremony also showed how Southeast Asia has become one of the world’s most contested geopolitical spaces.
Founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, ASEAN has grown into an 11-member organization following the admission of Timor-Leste in 2025. But its importance is no longer confined to Southeast Asia. Major global powers now view the organization as an essential platform through which they can advance their economic, diplomatic and security interests across the Indo-Pacific.
Yet ASEAN's central role in the region does not necessarily mean that the bloc is choosing sides. Quite the opposite. The more competition intensifies among the United States, China, Russia and other external powers, the more valuable ASEAN's traditional policy of strategic autonomy becomes.
China is a major factor for most, if not all, ASEAN member states. Geography and economics have made Beijing indispensable to Southeast Asia. The People’s Republic has been ASEAN's largest trading partner for years, while Chinese companies are deeply integrated into regional supply chains, infrastructure and investment networks. At the same time, China's growing presence in the region creates concerns among several ASEAN members, particularly because of disputes in the South China Sea.
This situation gives ASEAN governments a difficult but useful position. Countries such as The Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore have shown that that it is possible to deepen economic cooperation with Beijing while simultaneously strengthening security and diplomatic relations with Washington. Vietnam, on the other hand, demonstrates a different form of strategic balancing. China is its largest single trading partner, while Russia has long been its main source of military hardware.
The United States, for its part, has made clear that it intends to remain deeply engaged in the region. As the largest single foreign direct investor in Southeast Asia, with bilateral trade with ASEAN reaching $580.1 billion in 2025, the US has signaled its plans to strengthen its position in in this part of the world. At the July ASEAN meetings in Manila, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described Southeast Asia as “central to the future of the 21st century” and announced Washington’s plans for $2.5 billion in strategic investment in ASEAN.
Russia, however, seems determined to remain relevant in the region, though that will be easier said than done. Moscow's economic weight in Southeast Asia is much smaller than that of China or the United States. Nevertheless, the Kremlin retains instruments of influence in defense, energy and diplomacy. In June, ASEAN and Russia marked 35 years of dialogue relations in the Russian city of Kazan, while the two sides adopted a new 2026–2030 plan of action and statements on energy and cultural cooperation.
For Moscow, ASEAN is particularly useful because most Southeast Asian governments have refused to adopt the kind of comprehensive anti-Russian policy pursued by the United States and European countries following the invasion of Ukraine. ASEAN members have generally sought to preserve diplomatic and economic relations with Russia while avoiding a direct confrontation with Moscow.
But Russia faces a fundamental disadvantage. It cannot compete with China economically or with the United States militarily and institutionally. Its importance to ASEAN therefore depends heavily on its ability to offer something specific – energy, weapons, diplomatic cooperation or access to the Russian market—rather than on broad economic integration. Still, as Ukraine continues to target Russia’s energy sector and logistics networks, it remains uncertain whether Moscow can sustain its current level of engagement in Southeast Asia.
But the competition in the region is no longer limited to Washington, Beijing and Moscow. ASEAN’s recent decision to officially admit Türkiye as its 12th full Dialogue Partner is an important indication of how the organization's international significance is expanding. Policy makers in Ankara seem to be fully aware of this.
Ankara’s interest is understandable, as ASEAN offers access to one of the world's fastest-growing economic regions, as well as a diplomatic platform at a time when middle powers are seeking greater room for maneuver. Although Türkiye is not in a position to rival China or the United States in Southeast Asia, it undoubtedly has the capacity to establish itself as another useful partner in areas such as trade, transport, defense, technology and diplomacy.
The same logic applies to other external powers such as Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, the European Union and the United Kingdom, all of which seek to strengthen their ties with ASEAN. That, however, does not mean that Southeast Asian governments are interested in allowing their region to become an arena for a new Cold War.
ASEAN is unlikely to choose between China and the United States, or between Russia and the West, as long as it can avoid doing so. Instead, the organization is likely to continue engaging all sides while attempting to preserve its central role in the regional architecture. In other words, ASEAN centrality means that the bloc aims to lead regional talks rather than letting outside powers take control.
Still, ASEAN's greatest achievement over the past 59 years may be not that it has become powerful enough to dominate the global stage, but that it has become important enough for almost everyone to want a relationship with it.
Finally, while world powers will almost certainly continue competing for influence in Southeast Asia, ASEAN seems determined to make that competition work to its advantage.
Maritime trackers received new reports of an attack on a ship in the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday, according to the UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), adding to concerns about energy supplies after Saudi Arabia shut down a vital oil pipeline on Saturday.
A Kyiv-Warsaw train was struck near the Polish border, Ukraine's state railway firm said on Sunday. No passengers were injured. Ukrainian Railways said that the country's railways were facing systematic attacks for a second day and warned of widespread delays.
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