Bab al-Mandab emerges as second pressure point in Middle East energy crisis

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Disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has increased the strategic importance of Bab al-Mandab, raising fears that instability in both waterways could trigger a wider global energy and trade crisis.

In the twenty-first century, disrupting critical logistics infrastructure is often more strategically effective than conducting a conventional military invasion. Modern economies depend on uninterrupted trade and energy flows, making maritime chokepoints particularly attractive targets in hybrid warfare.

Events in and around the Strait of Hormuz have demonstrated how quickly maritime disruption can affect global energy markets. With a single political decision, Iran created one of the most serious disruptions to global energy markets in recent years. In a short period, the closure threatened nearly 20 per cent of global oil supplies, forcing both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries to release strategic petroleum reserves to stabilise the market.

Hybrid warfare through proxy power

Today, the world faces a similar challenge, but this time through Iran's proxy forces rather than direct action by Tehran.

On 20 July, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen announced a maritime embargo against Saudi Arabia following a 13 Julystrike on Sanaa International Airport, which is controlled by the group.

The Houthis' military spokesman, Yahya Saree, presented the blockade as retaliation for what he described as Saudi Arabia's 12-year blockade of ports and airports in Houthi-controlled northwestern Yemen. Meanwhile, Nasruddin Amer, deputy head of the Houthi press office, declared on X that the movement intended to prevent "hostile Saudi vessels" from passing through the strategic waterway.

This development directly threatens a maritime route whose importance has increased dramatically since the Strait of Hormuz became unreliable.

Bab al-Mandab, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean between Yemen, Djibouti and Eritrea, has become the principal export route for Saudi crude.

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Since the U.S.-Iran conflict escalated in February last year, Saudi Arabia has progressively redirected millions of barrels of oil per day to its Red Sea export terminal as tanker traffic through Hormuz has become increasingly disrupted.

Riyadh has expanded the use of its East-West Pipeline to its full capacity of approximately seven million barrels per day, transporting crude overland from its eastern oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu and thereby bypassing Hormuz.

By some accounts, the port has been moving more than 4.5 million barrels of crude and refined products a day since April, with roughly 70 per cent of that volume bound for Asian buyers.

However, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz solves only part of the problem. Although Saudi oil can reach the Red Sea through the East-West Pipeline, it must still transit the Bab al-Mandab Strait to access Asian markets. There is no viable southern maritime alternative.

Consequently, any disruption at Bab al-Mandab would effectively block Saudi exports for a second time, compounding the supply shock already created by the reduced accessibility of Hormuz.

The consequences extend far beyond the immediate chokepoint. Reduced traffic through Bab al-Mandab would further disrupt shipping via the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) Pipeline.

During previous disruptions in the Red Sea, combined oil flows through these routes declined from approximately 8.8 million barrels per day to 4.8 million barrels per day, illustrating how instability at a single maritime chokepoint can rapidly cascade across the global energy supply chain.

Tracking data from analytics firm Kpler underscores how far that cascade has already gone in the current round of tensions. On 26 July, only 11 cargo vessels transited Bab al-Mandab, the lowest number in months.

The strait is not closed outright, and some tankers continue to accept the risk, but a growing share of traffic is instead being diverted around Africa.

Significance of the Bab al-Mandab Strait

The Bab al-Mandab Strait is about 32 kilometres wide at its narrowest point and roughly 100 kilometres long. It lies between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Geographically, it separates Asia from Africa and serves as the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

As one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints, Bab al-Mandab serves as a gateway linking Asian producers with European and North American markets. It is particularly important for global energy supplies because it provides the principal route for crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) transported from the Persian Gulf through the Red Sea toward the Suez Canal and the SUMED Pipeline.

According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, oil shipments passing through the Red Sea chokepoints, including Bab al-Mandab, accounted for approximately 12 per cent of total seaborne-traded oil and about 8 per cent of global LNG trade during the first half of 2023.

In 2023, around 9.3 million barrels of oil transited the strait each day. Following the escalation of Houthi attacks in 2024, however, this volume declined to approximately 4.1 million barrels per day, demonstrating the route's vulnerability to geopolitical instability.

Unlike the Strait of Hormuz, whose strategic significance stems primarily from its role as an energy corridor, Bab al-Mandab functions as both an energy and global-trade chokepoint.

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In addition to oil and LNG, it carries roughly 10 per cent of global seaborne trade, including containerised cargo, manufactured goods, food products and industrial components moving between Asia and Europe.

Consequently, disruptions at Bab al-Mandab extend well beyond energy markets, increasing shipping costs, delaying supply chains, disrupting port operations and contributing to inflationary pressures across the global economy.

The global consequences of such disruptions are amplified by the integrated nature of the international oil market. Oil is traded in a single global market in which every producer sells into the same supply pool and every consumer purchases from that shared market.

With global production and consumption each averaging around 100 million barrels per day and virtually no spare capacity, even a regional supply disruption rapidly affects worldwide prices.

A loss of supply at one strategic chokepoint therefore alters the global balance between supply and demand rather than merely affecting the surrounding region.

This explains why disruptions to maritime routes such as Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab generate immediate consequences for countries far removed from the Middle East, including higher fuel prices, increased transport costs and broader economic uncertainty.

The scale of the potential disruption becomes even greater when the two chokepoints are considered together. Approximately 20 per cent of the world's seaborne crude oil normally passes through the Strait of Hormuz, while Bab al-Mandab carries an additional 10 per cent of global seaborne oil trade, together with around one-tenth of world merchandise trade.

If both waterways were disrupted simultaneously, nearly one-third of global seaborne oil trade would be blocked, while one of the world's most important Asia-Europe commercial corridors would be severely constrained.

Such a scenario would trigger not only an energy shock but also a broader trade and logistics crisis, with cascading effects on global supply chains, freight costs, inflation and economic stability.

Bab al-Mandab in the context of U.S. Hormuz strategy

Bab al-Mandab's strategic role is closely tied to Washington's calculations over the Strait of Hormuz because the two chokepoints have become part of the same strategic equation rather than separate security challenges.

Any U.S. decision on Hormuz is therefore likely to influence developments in the Red Sea.

Washington effectively faces three broad options. The first is to continue the current war of attrition, preserving the blockade of Iranian ports and maintaining economic pressure through sanctions.

While this strategy avoids the risks of a major escalation, it also prolongs uncertainty in global energy markets as strategic petroleum reserves continue to decline.

The second option is military escalation. Yet a broader campaign would offer only limited prospects for a decisive outcome.

A large-scale ground operation along Iran's Gulf coast is estimated to require roughly 100,000 troops, around twice the current U.S. force posture in the region, while the United States has already depleted a substantial share of its Patriot interceptor inventory defending against Iranian missile and drone attacks.

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More importantly, a wider conflict would likely encourage the Houthis to intensify operations in the Red Sea, placing even greater pressure on Bab al-Mandab and further reducing commercial shipping through the strait.

The third option is a negotiated settlement. Reports suggest that discussions facilitated by Oman envision an arrangement under which southbound shipping would move freely, while northbound traffic would require Tehran's authorisation and payment for services such as maritime security or environmental oversight.

Such an agreement appears to offer the most realistic path toward restoring navigation through Hormuz in the near term.

Even if negotiations succeed in Hormuz, however, stability in Bab al-Mandab is not guaranteed. The Red Sea front follows its own political and military dynamics, and any lasting reduction in tensions would also require a parallel understanding between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis.

For Iran, maintaining Houthi pressure in the Red Sea provides an additional source of leverage during negotiations, ensuring that progress on Hormuz alone does not eliminate Tehran's ability to influence regional energy flows.

In this sense, Bab al-Mandab functions less as an independent theatre of conflict than as a strategic reserve of coercive pressure, allowing Iran and its allies to retain bargaining power even if an agreement over Hormuz is reached.

Tags

Middle East energy Trade Hybrid warfire Strait of Hormuz Yemen Europe