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Russia and NATO appear to be entering a new phase of strategic rivalry as hopes of renewed diplomacy fade and both sides prepare for a prolonged period of confrontation.

Only a few months ago, the so-called "Spirit of Alaska" briefly raised hopes that Moscow and Washington might find a limited diplomatic formula to stabilise the war in Ukraine and reduce the risk of a broader confrontation between Russia and NATO. Informal contacts, discussions about possible confidence-building measures and speculation over future negotiations created an atmosphere of cautious optimism.

That atmosphere has now largely faded. Recent statements from senior U.S. officials, increasingly confrontational rhetoric in Russian state and pro-Kremlin media, and President Vladimir Putin's latest address to military academy graduates all point in the same direction: Russia is preparing politically, psychologically and militarily for a prolonged period of strategic rivalry with the West. The question is no longer whether tensions will continue, but how both sides intend to manage an increasingly institutionalised confrontation.

The upcoming NATO summit in Ankara therefore arrives at a critical moment. European allies are discussing higher defence spending, stronger deterrence and long-term military preparedness. Moscow, meanwhile, presents itself as a country that has adapted to sanctions, expanded defence production and learned to fight a prolonged war.

The emerging picture is not necessarily that of a stronger Russia in absolute terms. Rather, it is that of a more defiant and militarised Russia, increasingly convinced that diplomacy alone cannot protect its interests.

The end of the "Spirit of Alaska"

The phrase "Spirit of Alaska" was never an official diplomatic doctrine. Yet it became a useful shorthand for a brief period when analysts believed Moscow and Washington might be searching for a way out of the current impasse. The expectation was not a grand peace agreement, but perhaps a limited framework that could reduce the risk of escalation and eventually reopen the door to negotiations.

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Recent developments suggest that this window has narrowed sharply. U.S. officials have signalled that no breakthrough is imminent, while Russian officials increasingly portray earlier discussions as another example of Western unwillingness to compromise. The tone in pro-Kremlin media has also become harsher, with commentators arguing that Russia should rely primarily on military strength and strategic patience rather than diplomatic expectations.

For Moscow, the central lesson appears to be that the West remains committed to supporting Ukraine over the long term, including through new military capabilities and investment. For Washington and many NATO capitals, the lesson is that Russia shows little sign of accepting the conditions they consider necessary for a negotiated settlement.

This mutual scepticism is producing a new geopolitical reality. The immediate fear is not a direct NATO-Russia war, which both sides still seek to avoid because of the devastation it could cause. The greater concern is the gradual normalisation of prolonged confrontation, in which military deterrence, economic pressure and geopolitical competition become permanent features of the international system.

In that sense, the end of the "Spirit of Alaska" may represent less the failure of a single diplomatic effort than the collapse of one of the last significant expectations that a rapid political solution remained within reach.

Putin's military message

Perhaps the clearest indication of Moscow's current mindset came during Putin's meeting with military academy graduates on 23 June. The event was formally a graduation ceremony, but its content carried a broader strategic message.

Putin emphasised the modernisation of Russia's armed forces, the expansion of defence production, the strengthening of the nuclear triad and the deployment of new missile systems. He also argued that NATO is accelerating military preparations near Russia's borders and that Russia must respond accordingly.

The message was unmistakable: Moscow expects a prolonged period of confrontation and intends to prepare for it.

Particularly striking was the limited expectation that diplomacy would soon replace military competition. Instead, the speech portrayed Russia as a country surrounded by hostile forces and therefore compelled to rely on military capability, technological adaptation and national resilience.

This narrative serves several purposes. Domestically, it reinforces national unity and justifies continued military spending. Internationally, it signals that Russia does not believe time is necessarily working against it. On the contrary, the Kremlin increasingly argues that Russia has survived the most difficult phase of sanctions pressure and adapted its economy to wartime conditions.

Whether this assessment is entirely accurate is open to debate. The important point is that Russian policymakers increasingly appear to believe it themselves.

Stronger or simply more resilient?

This is perhaps the most important analytical question. Many Western commentators argue that Russia has been weakened by the war in Ukraine, sanctions and international isolation. There is considerable evidence to support this view. Russia has faced economic pressure, technological restrictions, demographic strain and substantial military losses.

Yet focusing only on these weaknesses risks overlooking another reality: Russia has also demonstrated a significant capacity for adaptation.

Russian defence production has expanded. Drone manufacturing has increased. Military recruitment has continued despite high costs. Trade patterns have shifted towards Asia and the Global South. With direct or indirect support from partners such as China and India, the Russian economy, while under pressure, has not collapsed as many initially predicted.

This does not mean Russia is stronger than it was before 2022. In many respects, it is not. But it does suggest Russia has become more experienced in operating under conditions of confrontation and sanctions.

A useful distinction, therefore, is between strength and resilience. Russia may not possess greater overall economic power than before the war, but it has developed greater resilience in key strategic sectors. The Kremlin increasingly presents this resilience as evidence that Western pressure has failed.

This perception matters because foreign policy is shaped not only by objective realities but also by how leaders interpret those realities. If Russian decision-makers believe the country has successfully adapted, they are likely to adopt a more confident and less compromising negotiating position.

NATO's Ankara summit

The NATO summit in Ankara on 7-8 July will take place against this backdrop of hardened positions.

European allies are expected to discuss higher defence spending, expanded military capabilities and long-term deterrence measures. Many governments now believe the security environment has fundamentally changed and that Europe must prepare for a prolonged period of strategic competition with Russia.

The debate is no longer simply about supporting Ukraine. It is increasingly about the future structure of European security itself, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Baltic region.

At the same time, the alliance faces internal questions over burden-sharing, industrial capacity and the long-term role of the U.S. European leaders want stronger American commitments, but they also recognise that Washington's priorities may not always align perfectly with their own.

For Moscow, these discussions reinforce the Kremlin's argument that NATO is preparing for a prolonged confrontation. For NATO members, Russia's military modernisation and wartime adaptation reinforce the alliance's view that deterrence must be strengthened.

The result is a classic security dilemma: each side views its own actions as defensive while interpreting the other's actions as threatening.

Ironically, this could produce a prolonged period of what might be described as a cold peace. Neither NATO nor Russia appears to be seeking direct military conflict. Yet neither side currently believes a comprehensive political settlement is realistic. Instead, both are investing in deterrence, military preparedness and long-term strategic competition.

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The consequences could shape European politics for years to come. Higher defence budgets, expanded arms production, stronger military infrastructure and deeper geopolitical polarisation are likely to become enduring features of the continent's security landscape. In this environment, neighbouring actors such as Türkiye and Azerbaijan may find their strategic importance increasing, particularly as the Black Sea, South Caucasus and Eurasian connectivity corridors become more central to the wider strategic balance.

A new phase in Russia-West rivalry

The collapse of the "Spirit of Alaska" does not mean diplomacy has disappeared forever. Channels of communication still exist, and future negotiations remain possible. However, the political atmosphere has changed.

Russia now presents itself as a state that has endured sanctions, adapted to war and prepared for a prolonged confrontation. NATO, meanwhile, is preparing for a future in which deterrence and defence once again become central priorities.

What is emerging is not necessarily the beginning of a new world war, nor a simple return to Cold War conditions. Rather, it is the emergence of a more structured and potentially long-lasting geopolitical rivalry.

Putin's latest military rhetoric, the increasingly hardline tone of Russian public discourse and the expectations surrounding the NATO summit all point towards the same conclusion: both sides appear to be preparing less for reconciliation than for managing a prolonged strategic competition.

If Alaska symbolised the last serious hope for a negotiated pause, the NATO summit in Ankara may instead mark the beginning of a new phase, one in which Russia and the Atlantic Alliance accept that their rivalry is becoming not temporary but structural.

In that new reality, the most important question may no longer be how quickly peace can be achieved, but how successfully both sides can prevent prolonged confrontation from developing into a broader and more destructive crisis.

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News Russia NATO Vladimir Putin Ankara Conflict