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Russia’s greatest strategic asset is not only military power, but political will  

History is filled with costly miscalculations about great powers. Some were overestimated. Others were underestimated. Few mistakes, however, have proved as consequential as repeatedly dismissing Russia’s declared security concerns as mere negotiating tactics or political theatre.

Whether one admires or opposes the Kremlin’s policies is beside the point. Foreign policy is not built on sympathy. It is built on understanding. For countries such as Türkiye, which shares both geography and history with Russia, interpreting Moscow’s strategic culture accurately is not an academic exercise. It is a national imperative.

That does not mean accepting Russia’s actions or legitimising its war against Ukraine. It means recognising that major powers often act according to strategic assumptions they have stated openly for years. Ignoring those signals can be dangerous, especially when they come from a state willing to absorb heavy costs in pursuit of what it defines as vital interests.

Power in international politics is measured not only by GDP, technological sophistication or military expenditure. It is also measured by political resolve. States become credible when they show a willingness to translate declared red lines into action.

Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that once it concludes a core national interest is at stake, it is prepared to bear significant economic, diplomatic and military costs.

Munich: the speech the West preferred not to hear

President Vladimir Putin’s address at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007 should be remembered not merely as an angry speech, but as one of the defining strategic declarations of the twenty-first century. He warned that NATO’s continued eastward expansion would eventually become unacceptable for Russia, rejected what he described as a unipolar international order, and signalled that Moscow would defend what it considered its core security interests if necessary.

Much of the audience interpreted the speech as political posturing, intended for domestic consumption or designed to strengthen Russia’s bargaining position with the West. Few believed Moscow possessed either the capability or the determination to challenge the European security architecture so directly.

Subsequent events told a different story. The war with Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the conflict in Donbas and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 all followed the broad trajectory Moscow had already signalled. The issue is not whether Russia was justified. It was not. The point is that Russia acted in line with warnings that many Western policymakers chose to discount.

A strategic culture shaped by geography

Russia’s behaviour becomes easier to understand when viewed through the lens of its historical experience. Over centuries, repeated invasions from the west, combined with vast and difficult-to-defend frontiers, shaped a strategic culture that prioritises buffer zones, spheres of influence and strategic depth.

Unlike many Western security doctrines, Russian strategic thinking rarely begins at internationally recognised borders. It begins beyond them. This helps explain why Moscow attaches such importance to developments in neighbouring states and reacts so strongly when it perceives external military encroachment close to its frontiers.

This logic has characterised Russian policy for centuries. The Ottoman Empire encountered it repeatedly through its long rivalry with Imperial Russia, culminating in landmark moments such as the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which symbolised a profound shift in the regional balance of power. Russian strategy has often shown patience, long-term planning and institutional continuity that can outlast individual leaders.

Türkiye’s delicate balancing act

For Türkiye, Russia is neither an abstract geopolitical question nor simply another diplomatic relationship. The two countries share the Black Sea. They intersect across the Caucasus. They have found themselves on opposite sides in Syria and Libya, while also maintaining deep economic interdependence through energy, tourism, agriculture and trade.

The 2015 downing of a Russian military aircraft illustrated both the risks and the opportunities in this relationship. Moscow responded methodically through economic and diplomatic pressure rather than immediate military escalation. Equally important was the subsequent restoration of dialogue at the highest political level. That experience showed that sustained communication between leaders can prevent strategic rivalry from becoming permanent confrontation.

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As NATO prepares to convene its summit in Ankara in July 2026, Türkiye occupies a uniquely valuable position. It remains a committed member of the Atlantic Alliance while also being one of the few NATO states capable of maintaining direct and credible dialogue with the Kremlin.

Preserving that dual capability may prove to be one of Ankara’s greatest strategic assets in an increasingly fragmented international order.

The danger of strategic miscalculation

History rarely repeats itself precisely, but it often punishes similar mistakes. European leaders in 1914 underestimated escalation. In 1938, they overestimated the stabilising power of concessions. Today, one of the most dangerous assumptions is the belief that Russia “would never go that far”.

During recent meetings in Moscow with two of Russia’s most influential strategic thinkers, Sergey Karaganov and Dmitry Trenin, I encountered a perspective that differs sharply from prevailing Western narratives. Russian policymakers increasingly frame the current confrontation not as a temporary geopolitical dispute, but as a prolonged contest over Russia’s future place in the international system.

Viewed through that prism, recent revisions to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, military deployments in Belarus, force modernisation in Kaliningrad and repeated security warnings directed at Europe should not automatically be dismissed as empty rhetoric.

This does not mean conflict is inevitable. It does not mean Moscow is always correct. It means prudent governments should prepare for worst-case scenarios rather than rely on optimistic assumptions.

Beyond Ukraine: the Azerbaijan dimension

If the war in Ukraine eventually stabilises on terms Moscow considers strategically acceptable, attention may shift towards Russia’s wider neighbourhood. The South Caucasus, where Russian influence is being challenged by Türkiye, the European Union and increasingly China, could become one of the next arenas of intensified geopolitical competition.

For Azerbaijan, this presents both opportunity and risk. Baku has pursued a sophisticated multi-vector foreign policy, balancing constructive relations with Russia while deepening its strategic partnership with Türkiye and expanding energy ties with Europe.

At the same time, new transport corridors, including the prospective Zangezur route, are reshaping the geopolitical map of Eurasia.

The challenge for Azerbaijan will be to preserve its strategic autonomy without becoming an arena for renewed great-power rivalry. Stability in the South Caucasus will depend not only on military deterrence, but also on economic connectivity, regional integration and pragmatic diplomacy.

For both Ankara and Baku, the lesson is similar. Russia’s capabilities should not be exaggerated. Its intentions should not be romanticised. But neither should they be underestimated. Effective statecraft begins by taking seriously what major powers consistently say about their vital interests.

The greatest danger posed by Moscow is not only the power it possesses. It is its demonstrated willingness to use that power when it concludes that core security interests are at stake. That is not an argument for deference. It is an argument for strategic realism.

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