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Will the negotiations in Switzerland succeed? That has become the dominant question surrounding the latest round of US-Iran diplomacy. It is also the wrong one.

Whether Washington and Tehran ultimately reach another understanding on uranium enrichment, sanctions relief or verification mechanisms will matter. But the more important question is what kind of negotiations these really are.

To view Switzerland simply as another attempt to revive nuclear diplomacy is to miss the deeper strategic shift produced by the recent conflict. The war involving the United States, Israel and Iran changed not only the military balance, but also the purpose of diplomacy. Unlike previous rounds of nuclear talks before 28 February, which took place without a direct military confrontation between Washington and Tehran, the current negotiations are unfolding in the aftermath of open war.

The nuclear file remains central. But it no longer explains the whole diplomatic picture.

Beyond the nuclear file

The real significance of the Swiss talks lies elsewhere. They are not primarily about ending the rivalry between Washington and Tehran. They are about preventing that rivalry from repeatedly producing regional wars.

The conflict altered the calculations of both sides. For Washington, military superiority again showed its limits as an instrument for reshaping the regional environment. The United States and Israel appear to have inflicted serious damage on parts of Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. Yet military pressure alone did not remove Iran from the regional equation or impose a new regional order on American terms.

For Tehran, survival came at a considerable cost. The Islamic Republic absorbed military losses, economic disruption and unprecedented pressure on its leadership and strategic infrastructure. Iran avoided strategic collapse, but it also confronted the limits of sustaining direct conflict against adversaries with overwhelming conventional military superiority.

Diplomacy without precedent

Both sides therefore arrived in Switzerland having learned a similar lesson: another large-scale confrontation would almost certainly generate costs greater than any realistic political gain.

This does not mean deterrence has disappeared. On the contrary, deterrence may have become more reciprocal because both sides now understand the consequences of escalation more clearly. War has not ended the rivalry. It has made its limits visible.

That is what distinguishes the current talks from previous diplomatic efforts. For decades, nuclear diplomacy was largely treated as a separate file. The assumption was that disagreements over uranium enrichment could be compartmentalised from wider regional tensions.

The recent conflict exposed the weakness of that assumption. Escalation no longer follows a single track. A military strike can quickly affect maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz, disrupt global energy markets, activate allied and proxy actors across several theatres, and generate diplomatic crises involving states that were not part of the initial confrontation.

Expanded diplomatic priorities

Security challenges that once looked separate have become deeply interconnected.

This makes narrow diplomacy less effective. An agreement on centrifuge numbers alone cannot prevent future crises if there are no mechanisms to manage escalation. That is why the Swiss talks matter beyond the nuclear file.

Maritime security, military communication channels, the sequencing of sanctions relief, implementation procedures, regional theatres such as Lebanon, and broader crisis-management mechanisms have all become part of the strategic conversation. Some may be included formally in a final agreement. Others may be handled through parallel understandings. Either way, the direction is clear.

Switzerland is not negotiating peace. It is negotiating crisis management.

That may sound less ambitious than reconciliation. It is also more realistic. After four decades of confrontation, neither Washington nor Tehran is trying to eliminate the rivalry. The practical question is whether that rivalry can be managed without repeatedly descending into open conflict.

Managing a rivalry with global implications

The implications extend beyond the two negotiating parties. For Gulf states, even a limited U.S.-Iran crisis-management framework could reduce the likelihood that their territories again become arenas for military confrontation or economic coercion. Greater predictability in the Strait of Hormuz would matter not only for regional security, but also for global energy markets.

Israel would continue to confront Iran strategically. But clearer communication between Washington and Tehran could reduce the risk of uncontrolled escalation drawing multiple regional actors into conflict.

In other words, the negotiations are not simply an attempt to regulate bilateral relations. They are testing whether a minimum level of strategic predictability can be restored to a region where almost every security crisis now carries the potential to become regional.

This also explains one of the central paradoxes emerging from the war. One assumption behind the military campaign was that weakening Iran would create more favourable conditions for a new regional equilibrium. The return to negotiations suggests a different reality.

Whatever the military balance, no sustainable regional order can be built by pretending that one of the region’s principal strategic actors can simply be removed from the equation.

Recognising this does not mean accepting Iranian policy or legitimising Iran’s regional behaviour. Nor does it diminish the role of the United States or its regional partners. It simply acknowledges that stability increasingly depends on mechanisms capable of managing competition among existing actors, rather than assuming some of them can be excluded from the strategic landscape altogether.

None of this guarantees success. Crisis management is inherently fragile. It depends on sustained communication, political restraint and a willingness to contain escalation precisely when domestic pressure pushes leaders toward confrontation.

Reaching an understanding in Switzerland may prove difficult. Preserving it during the next regional crisis will be harder.

A new outlook on managing regional stability

Yet even before a final outcome emerges, the talks have already revealed something important. The central challenge facing the Middle East is no longer simply how to deter rivals. It is how to prevent enduring rivalries from repeatedly producing wars whose costs continue to rise for the entire region.

Switzerland is therefore not negotiating peace. Peace remains distant. What is being negotiated are the minimum rules, communication channels and understandings needed to manage the next crisis before it becomes the next war.

In today’s Middle East, that may be the most realistic and consequential achievement diplomacy can deliver.

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Iran USA MiddleEastConflict