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The era of uncontested Russian dominance in the South Caucasus appears to be weakening. 

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won the 7 June parliamentary election, giving him a renewed mandate at a moment when Armenia’s foreign policy direction, its peace agenda with Azerbaijan and its ties with Moscow are all being tested.

Historical Russian ties

The result does not mean that Armenia has broken with Russia. Geography, energy ties, trade flows and security habits do not disappear overnight. But it does suggest that Moscow’s old ability to define Armenia’s room for manoeuvre has become more limited.

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Before the election, Civil Contract was widely expected to emerge as the strongest political force. The main question was whether it would secure enough seats to govern alone and how much room Pashinyan would have to pursue constitutional reform, peace with Azerbaijan and a continued rebalancing of Armenia’s external partnerships.

The Armenian opposition entered the election divided and weakened. Much of it remained associated, directly or indirectly, with a pro-Russian political line at a time when many Armenians have grown more sceptical of Moscow. The Second Garabagh War and the events that followed changed how large parts of Armenian society viewed Russia’s role as a security partner.

Moscow’s pressure before the vote appears to have had the opposite effect of what it intended. Russian criticism of Pashinyan, threats around energy supplies and restrictions on Armenian products gave many voters a further reason to support a leader who has promised a more diversified foreign policy.

Reducing dependence

Pashinyan’s next government is unlikely to pursue a purely anti-Russian course. Armenia remains economically linked to Russia and cannot simply abandon those ties without cost. The more likely path is realpolitik. Yerevan will try to reduce dependence on Moscow while keeping enough working relations to avoid unnecessary rupture.

That balancing act will be difficult. Russia remains Armenia’s largest single trade partner and still has several ways to apply pressure. If Moscow continues to restrict Armenian exports or threatens preferential energy arrangements, the economic consequences for Armenia could be serious.

Yet the political effect of such pressure may be counterproductive for Russia. The more Moscow uses trade, energy or information tools against Yerevan, the more it strengthens the argument that Armenia needs alternatives.

This raises a wider question about Armenia’s place in Russian-led structures. Yerevan has already suspended its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. If economic pressure continues, debate over Armenia’s role in the Eurasian Economic Union and other post-Soviet institutions could become more serious.

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Pro-Kremlin commentators have often argued that countries reducing their dependence on Russia will face collapse. Similar warnings were made about Ukraine after 2014 and later about Europe during its energy break with Moscow. Those forecasts proved overstated.

EU and U.S. support

Armenia will face costs if it moves further away from Russia. But it is unlikely to face them alone. The European Union and the United States have already shown growing interest in supporting Yerevan’s westward orientation. Armenia’s smaller size also means that financial support, if politically agreed, would be far less costly than Ukraine-scale assistance.

But in politics, as in life, there is no free lunch. Western support will almost certainly come with expectations. The European Union may press for economic and institutional reforms, while the United States is likely to attach importance to regional connectivity, including the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, known as TRIPP. The project would connect mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through southern Armenia.

Azerbaijan, for its part, continues to view constitutional change in Armenia as one of the remaining obstacles to a lasting peace agreement. Pashinyan’s victory may give him more political space to return to this question. But Civil Contract did not secure the two-thirds majority needed to call a constitutional referendum, which means the issue remains procedurally and politically complex.

Even so, the direction of travel is clear. Under Pashinyan, Yerevan and Baku have begun exploring practical steps toward normalisation. Armenia has resumed direct commercial imports of mineral fuels and petroleum products from Azerbaijan, and trade discussions between the two countries are underway.

The Serbia-Croatia experience shows that former enemies can eventually build commercial relations after war, although the South Caucasus has its own history, wounds and political realities. The comparison is useful only as a reminder that conflict does not have to remain the permanent organising principle of regional life.

Changing role of neighbours

If Armenia and Azerbaijan remain on the path of normalisation, the South Caucasus could enter a period of deep geopolitical transformation. Russia’s weakening hold over Armenia would create more room for other actors, including the West, Türkiye and Azerbaijan, to shape the region’s future.

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This does not mean Russia will disappear from the South Caucasus. It will remain present through trade, energy, diaspora ties, media influence and political networks. But influence is not the same as dominance. The difference matters.

A post-Russian South Caucasus would not necessarily be anti-Russian. It would be a region where Russia is one actor among several, rather than the central power around which every major decision is organised.

Over time, if borders reopen and transport links are restored, young Armenians and Azerbaijanis may begin travelling to each other’s countries again, as older generations once did in a different era. The difference is that the language of that future may not be Russian. It may be English, Turkish, Azerbaijani, Armenian, or simply the practical language of trade.

That is why Armenia’s election matters beyond Armenia itself. It may not mark the final end of Russian influence in the South Caucasus. But it may mark the beginning of the end of Russia’s uncontested dominance.

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Politics Russia analysis