Erdoğan says ‘constructive’ Trump meeting could boost U.S.-Türkiye defence ties
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Thursday that his recent talks with U.S. President Donald Trump would likely produce a “positive out...
The AnewZ Opinion section provides a platform for independent voices to share expert perspectives on global and regional issues. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official position of AnewZ
Armenia’s military parade on 28 May 2026 carried significance beyond military affairs. It was not only a display of newly acquired hardware. It also raised important questions about the peace process taking shape in the South Caucasus.
For decades, Armenia’s security model rested on a familiar geopolitical assumption. Armenia was presented as a state surrounded by hostile neighbours and exposed to existential threats. In that framework, survival depended on external protection, military patronage and geopolitical balancing. The unresolved Garabagh conflict served as the central pillar of this architecture. It justified Russian security guarantees, reinforced Armenia’s dependence on external security actors and regional partners, including Iran, and shaped a political culture built around insecurity and siege thinking.
Today, that regional environment is changing. The disappearance of the Garabagh issue in its previous form, the gradual normalisation agenda between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the emergence of regional connectivity projects are challenging the foundations of the old security model.
Perhaps the most important change is psychological. For the first time in decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan are gradually moving away from the assumption that each is the source of every security challenge in the region. This process remains incomplete and fragile. But signs of it are visible.
One revealing example came on 5 March 2026, when Azerbaijan accused Iran of launching drones that struck Nakhchivan, including airport infrastructure, and announced military mobilisation measures along parts of its borders. Under the old regional security logic, such developments could easily have triggered fears of an imminent Armenian Azerbaijani confrontation. Yet this did not happen. Armenia did not announce military mobilisation, and Armenian political discourse did not immediately frame Azerbaijani military activity as preparation for war against Armenia. Yerevan appeared to interpret Azerbaijan’s actions as linked primarily to concerns about Iran rather than Armenia.
Azerbaijan’s reaction to Armenia’s military parade points to a similar shift. Despite the large display of newly acquired weaponry and modern systems, there was a broad understanding in Azerbaijan that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, today one of the main political advocates of normalisation and peace within Armenia, was primarily addressing a domestic audience. The message was meant to show that Armenia under his leadership is neither weak nor defenceless.
That objective is politically significant. After Armenia’s military defeats in 2020 and 2023, security remains a highly sensitive issue in Armenian society. Pashinyan continues to face criticism from opponents who associate him with military losses, strategic setbacks and concessions. Ahead of parliamentary elections, the parade was therefore designed to reassure voters that peace does not mean weakness and that Armenia remains able to defend its sovereignty.
Today, the central debate inside Armenia is no longer only about foreign policy. It is about the nature of Armenian statehood itself.
One vision argues that Armenia remains surrounded by threats and therefore needs powerful external sponsors to guarantee its security. The alternative vision, increasingly associated with Pashinyan’s concept of Real Armenia, proposes a different trajectory. It suggests that Armenia should gradually become a more sovereign and autonomous regional actor, able to build pragmatic relations with neighbours while reducing excessive dependence on external patrons. In this view, peace, connectivity, trade and regional integration are instruments of sovereignty, not threats to it.
Yet another dimension is rarely discussed openly. Not all external actors support Armenia’s military modernisation for the same reasons.
This raises an uncomfortable question. Which external powers genuinely seek to help Armenia become a more sovereign state, and which may be interested in preserving elements of the old geopolitical model? More importantly, what criteria should be used to distinguish between these motivations?
If some foreign actors view military assistance to Armenia as a mechanism for supporting regional peace, then another question follows. To what extent are they communicating this logic to Azerbaijan?
A frequent argument in diplomatic and expert circles is that Armenia needs stronger defensive capabilities in order to feel secure enough to pursue peace. According to this interpretation, military modernisation is not intended to support revisionism or future confrontation. It is meant to strengthen the political forces inside Armenia that advocate normalisation and a peace agreement with Azerbaijan.
If this is the strategic rationale behind military assistance, then a diplomatic question becomes unavoidable. Are the countries supplying these weapons engaging in parallel dialogue with Azerbaijan? Are they explaining that their objective is to strengthen Armenia’s sovereignty and reinforce the political position of those advocating peace? Or are weapons being delivered without a corresponding political dialogue aimed at reducing regional concerns?
This distinction matters because intentions are never self-evident.
A related question concerns regional connectivity projects such as TRIPP, the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, a planned rail and road corridor through Armenia linking mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. These projects are not viewed as purely bilateral arrangements between individual countries. Azerbaijani concerns are routinely discussed as part of broader regional negotiations. Should a similar principle apply to Armenia’s military modernisation and the rebuilding of its armed forces? To what extent should regional perceptions and concerns be incorporated into the process?
These questions matter because the emerging South Caucasus peace architecture rests on a new assumption: Armenia and Azerbaijan are gradually ceasing to view one another as the primary source of security challenge.
This architecture remains fragile. It requires political agreements, but also reliable communication mechanisms that can prevent misunderstandings and manage mistrust.
Its success depends not only on the behaviour of Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also on the behaviour of external actors. If foreign powers genuinely support a South Caucasus built around sovereignty, connectivity and peace, then military cooperation with Armenia should be accompanied by diplomatic efforts aimed at reducing mistrust throughout the region.
Otherwise, a paradox emerges. Weapons supplied with the intention of strengthening peace may generate insecurity, deepen suspicions and undermine the very process they are meant to support.
The defining question, therefore, is not whether Armenia should possess a stronger military. The more important question is whether military modernisation is being integrated into a transparent regional peace strategy, or whether it remains disconnected from the broader political project of reconciliation and long term stability.
The answer may determine whether the emerging South Caucasus peace architecture consolidates itself or remains vulnerable to the fears, assumptions and geopolitical reflexes of the past.
The military parade in Yerevan was therefore not simply a display of power. It reflected a deeper struggle over the future of the region itself: which vision of Armenia will prevail, which external actors support that vision and to what extent Azerbaijan is included in the broader transformation taking place around it.
The real question is not whether Armenia becomes stronger militarily. It is whether that strength helps support a new regional order based on sovereignty, integration and peace, or whether it preserves the old architecture of fear, dependency and confrontation.
The future of the South Caucasus may depend on the answer.
It has been a punishing week for large parts of China, and forecasters warn the worst may not be over. After Typhoon Maysak left a trail of destruction and at least 23 people dead, Super Typhoon Bavi is now threatening the country's eastern coast.
At least 12 people have been killed in forest fires in Almeria in southern Spain, Andalucía’s emergency agency has said, as firefighters continue efforts to put out the blaze.
U.S. President Donald Trump said on Wednesday that the memorandum of understanding signed with Iran to end the conflict was "over", adding he did not want to engage with Tehran, calling the Iranian leadership "sick people".
The death toll from Venezuela's twin earthquakes has risen to 3,811, according to figures released by National Assembly President Jorge Rodriguez on Wednesday.
The U.S. military said on Wednesday it launched fresh strikes on Iran to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to shipping, triggering Iranian attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain in the latest escalation to derail efforts to end the war.
In April 2026, Azerbaijan’s National Assembly criminalised AI-generated sexual deepfakes created or shared without consent. The reform recognised digital sexual abuse as a serious crime. Cyberflashing should now be next.
Europe’s search for new energy suppliers is creating new strategic opportunities for Africa, with major pipeline projects promising to reshape energy diplomacy while deepening geopolitical competition.
History rarely enters international politics in isolation. More often, it arrives accompanied by shifting alliances, changing strategic calculations and evolving national interests.
In central bank vaults around the world, a quiet shift is underway. Gold is moving home. What was once stored comfortably in New York, London or other established financial centres is increasingly being reviewed, diversified or repatriated. This is not panic. It is prudence.
Russia and NATO appear to be entering a new phase of strategic rivalry as hopes of renewed diplomacy fade and both sides prepare for a prolonged period of confrontation.
You can download the AnewZ application from Play Store and the App Store.
What is your opinion on this topic?
Leave the first comment