Russia and Iran’s war strategies risk cycles of unresolved conflict

Russia and Iran’s war strategies risk cycles of unresolved conflict
Anewz

The AnewZ Opinion section provides a platform for independent voices to share expert perspectives on global and regional issues. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official position of AnewZ

Moscow and Tehran - comprehensive strategic partners since October 2025 - appear to share a similar approach to warfare: harsh rhetoric paired with actions that contradict their claims and ultimately undermine their own strategic interests.

As a result, Russia and Iran frequently find themselves forced into unfavourable deals with their opponents that fail to deliver lasting peace, instead freezing conflicts only temporarily.

A shared playbook

Iran’s modus operandi in its confrontation with the United States and Israel resembles that of Russia, which waged an indirect, proxy-style war in Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014–2015.

At the time, following violent protests in Kyiv’s Maidan Square that led to the overthrow of the allegedly pro-Russian Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, the Ukrainian state was in serious crisis. Its military in the Donbas suffered heavy losses and was on the brink of collapse.

Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin did not use the situation to seize the entire region. Instead, he forced his proxies to sign the Minsk Agreements - documents that put the conflict “on hold” until it erupted again on 24 February 2022. The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine is, therefore, a continuation of the Donbas war.

Iran and Hezbollah’s restrained response

Iran appears to have followed a similar pattern after the 7 October attacks in Gaza. While Israel was preoccupied with the situation in the Gaza Strip, Tehran-backed Hezbollah did not take actions that would cause serious harm to the Israeli military.

Instead, it targeted antennas and surveillance equipment along the Lebanese–Israeli border. In the meantime, Israel was able to prosecute the Gaza conflict largely in its favour.

Only in late September 2024 did Hezbollah fire its first Qader-1 ballistic missile targeting Tel Aviv. But that was “too little and too late”, as Israel responded swiftly, destroying the group’s arsenal of cruise missiles, long- and short-range rockets, and attack drones. It ultimately killed Hezbollah’s entire military and political leadership, including Hassan Nasrallah, the organisation’s longtime Secretary-General.

Weakened by its leadership’s - and Tehran’s - failure to act in a timely and effective manner, the group was not even in a position to assist Iran during Israel’s 2025 airstrike campaign. Instead, Hezbollah remained largely silent as Israel conducted a series of strikes on the Islamic Republic.

Strategic hesitation 

Although the organisation later stepped in, joining forces with Tehran to attack Israel following the U.S.–Israeli campaign against Iran on 28 February, Hezbollah has once again found itself exposed.

While Israel, following a U.S.–Iran ceasefire deal, continued bombing Lebanon, the Islamic Republic issued harsh threats but did not launch strikes against its adversary.

Iran did not even risk targeting the two U.S. Navy ships that reportedly attempted to transit the Strait of Hormuz on 11 April, most likely fearing that such action would prompt Washington to resume its attacks. The difficulty, however, is that the United States may ultimately resume its campaign regardless.

Ceasefire without resolution

Tehran remained committed to direct negotiations with the United States, despite Iranian leaders repeatedly stressing that they would hold no talks with Washington after a “very bad experience.” Throughout the conflict, Iran rejected U.S.-proposed ceasefire talks, insisting instead on a “permanent end to the war.”

Despite this rhetoric, as of 8 April 2026, the Islamic Republic accepted a conditional two-week ceasefire with the United States following mediation by Pakistan. Coincidentally or not, Russia adopted a similar approach in Ukraine.

While Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov claimed that Moscow “seeks not a ceasefire, but a sustainable, long-term peace”, Putin ordered a 32-hour ceasefire with Ukraine for the Orthodox Easter holiday, after which hostilities resumed.

Diplomacy without outcomes

Russia’s and Iran’s rhetoric does not align with their policy choices. Nevertheless, unlike Iran - which has firmly opposed talks with the U.S. following the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei - the Kremlin has never closed the door to diplomacy.

Since 2022, Russian and Ukrainian representatives have met several times - in Minsk, Istanbul, Abu Dhabi and Geneva - holding multiple rounds of talks. However, none of these negotiations have led to a lasting peace.

Most recently, on 22 January, Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff, accompanied by Jared Kushner, travelled to Moscow to meet Putin. Although Witkoff described the talks as “productive,” no agreement was reached and hostilities in Ukraine continue.

Witkoff and Kushner, who were later appointed as top U.S. negotiators for talks with Iran, also failed to secure a deal after marathon negotiations in Islamabad on 11 April.

Cycle of unfinished wars

The U.S. and Israel, through airstrikes, have not achieved their stated objectives in Iran - from regime change in Tehran to curbing its nuclear ambitions, missile programme and regional influence. Aware of this, U.S. President Donald Trump warned that if negotiations in Islamabad fail, U.S. warships - reloaded with “the best ammunition” - would resume strikes on Iran.

Under current conditions, the most the United States has achieved is a Minsk-style ceasefire with Iran, allowing both sides to prepare for a potentially more destructive confrontation in the future.

Russia has similarly failed to secure its strategic objectives in Ukraine, including the “demilitarisation” and “denazification” of the country, recognition of its annexation of the Donbas, and Kyiv’s permanent neutrality. At the same time, Ukraine has been unable to restore its 1991 borders, which remain its ultimate war aim.

In these circumstances, the conflict may follow a familiar trajectory: a ceasefire that freezes the fighting while laying the groundwork for a renewed and potentially more destructive phase of war.

This appears to be a defining feature of both conflicts. They are periodically placed “on hold” while their underlying causes remain unresolved.

Tags