Trump’s “special military operation” in Iran: Lessons from Ukraine

Trump’s “special military operation” in Iran: Lessons from Ukraine
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Starting a war is easy; ending one is far harder. The maxim, often attributed to Gabriel García Márquez, has held true in Ukraine. After four years of conflict, Russia has failed to achieve its strategic aims. Now the U.S. risks a similar outcome in Iran.

According to ancient Greek legend, when King Agamemnon set out to invade Troy, he expected a swift victory. Instead, the war dragged on for a decade. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to have made a similar miscalculation in 2022, launching what he expected to be a rapid campaign in Ukraine. Rather than a “three-day” operation culminating in a military parade in Kyiv, Russia remains bogged down, with no clear end in sight.

When U.S. President Donald Trump ordered large-scale strikes on Iran on 28 February, early assessments suggested the conflict might last only days. Soon after, American officials extended that estimate to several weeks. Now, with Trump’s blitzkrieg-style regime-change effort faltering, the U.S. appears entangled in what many already describe as another “endless war”.

Regime change and wartime realities

One of the central flaws in a regime-change strategy is that it is unlikely to succeed during active conflict. The killing of political leaders rarely produces systemic change. More often, it consolidates internal unity and strengthens support for the existing regime. In Iran, any transition aligned with U.S. and Israeli interests is more likely to emerge after hostilities cease, or during a ceasefire, rather than in the midst of war.

Unrealistic objectives

More troubling for U.S. policymakers is the likelihood that Washington’s core objectives in Iran are unattainable. Weakening the Islamic Republic’s military, curbing its support for regional proxies, and dismantling its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes would require months, if not years, of sustained operations.

Yet precedent offers little encouragement. Years of U.S., Israeli and Saudi airstrikes against Iran-backed Houthi forces in Yemen neither produced regime change in Sana’a nor significantly degraded their military capabilities. Without troops on the ground in Tehran - or a highly improbable internal uprising - the U.S. and Israel are unlikely to achieve their full strategic aims.

Lessons from Moscow’s recalibration

The Kremlin appears to have learned this lesson in Ukraine. Putin’s initial objectives - including the “demilitarisation” and “denazification” of Ukraine, recognition of Moscow’s annexation of the Donbas, and Ukraine’s permanent neutrality - would have required control of Kyiv and the installation of a compliant government.

By the spring of 2022, it had become evident that Russia lacked the capacity to secure these goals. Since then, Moscow has quietly narrowed its ambitions, focusing largely on territorial gains in the Donbas. U.S. officials appear to be following a similar pattern, repeatedly redefining their objectives in Iran.

The limits of threats and deterrence

Trump, however, has continued to issue forceful warnings to Tehran. Putin adopted a comparable strategy in Ukraine. Yet repeated threats that go unfulfilled risk eroding credibility. Russia has already reached a point where its warnings carry diminished weight.

The U.S. could face a similar trajectory. Iran, like Ukraine, has demonstrated a willingness to endure a prolonged conflict, even at the cost of widespread destruction, humanitarian crisis and environmental damage.

Strained alliances

Washington must also contend with the stance of its allies. While many have expressed nominal support for U.S. strikes, few have participated directly in military operations. Moreover, the U.S. has struggled to guarantee the security of Gulf states against Iranian retaliation, raising concerns about long-term trust.

Russia’s position is even more precarious, with only Belarus and North Korea offering tangible support for its war in Ukraine. Although the U.S., as a global hegemon, is unlikely to experience a comparable collapse in alliances, its actions in Iran may nonetheless erode credibility - particularly in the Middle East and, increasingly, in Europe.

A stronger position - but no easy victory

Despite the parallels, the U.S. remains far better positioned than Russia militarily, politically and economically. Even so, failure in Iran could carry domestic political consequences, potentially costing Republicans control in the midterm elections.

For Russia, the stakes are even higher: a decisive defeat in Ukraine could trigger systemic instability and raise questions about the future integrity of the Russian Federation.

The prospect of Pyrrhic victories

Even if Moscow and Washington ultimately prevail in Ukraine and Iran, such victories are likely to be Pyrrhic. Both Kyiv and Tehran have proved more resilient than many anticipated - a reminder that military power alone rarely delivers decisive political outcomes.

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