The dual nature of EU-China power dynamics in Central Asia

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Central Asia has been one of the important arenas of international geopolitics, dictating power dynamics with its abundant natural resources and strategic location.

From the Great Game in the 19th century to the present day, the Central Asian region has remained a crossroads of different global and regional powers’ interests, strategies and competition. The war in Ukraine and the resulting alienation between Russia and the West have shifted attention to Central Asia, a region that bypasses Russian territory, offers alternative trade and energy routes, and possesses both traditional and modern natural resources that have become highly sought after by both the European Union (EU) and China.

Even though Russia still holds an important foothold in the region, given their shared historical and political background, other global powers, such as China, the EU, and the U.S., have also increased their attention and efforts to engage with the Central Asian nations. China has been investing heavily in strengthening its relations with the Central Asian countries, which are perceived as essential for the further realization of its grand Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While Russia has been preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, China has taken the opportunity to deepen its ties with the region, especially in the areas of transportation and energy.

Ever since the onset of the war in Ukraine, the EU has been eager to alleviate its dependency on Russia’s energy sources, primarily gas. In parallel to seeking alternative providers of traditional energy, the EU has been actively looking for suppliers, other than China, of rare minerals essential for the green transition of its industry. Besides the critical rare minerals, Central Asia provides alternative trade routes that circumvent Russia and offers an opportunity to counterbalance Chinese and Russian influence in the region.

Another factor that allows for meaningful power dynamics between the EU and China in the region is that the Central Asian states have started actively pursuing “multi-vector” foreign policies, which aim to maximize their own benefits from increased cooperation with various global actors.

China’s interests in Central Asia

For China, Central Asia represents a region of immense strategic importance, as it continues to play a significant role in China’s energy sector, transport and logistics projects and regional security. The Sino-Central Asian cooperation is facilitated through China’s BRI, which has continued to expand since its launch in 2013, particularly in areas such as energy, mining, transport, telecommunications, and green technology.

Energy cooperation between China and Central Asia includes both traditional energy and renewables. China needs Central Asian oil and especially natural gas to meet its growing energy demand, which domestic production, Russian supplies, and vulnerable Middle Eastern sea routes cannot fully satisfy. Oil and gas imports from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan play an important role in China’s energy diversification strategy, which provides higher energy security for the country. China is also a major energy investor in Central Asian oil and gas production and infrastructure, supporting large-scale energy projects such as the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline and Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline and providing technical expertise.

In the area of clean energy, China has invested in infrastructure and projects that use the region’s considerable hydro, solar, and wind potential, particularly in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. China’s green push in Central Asia reflects the country’s multifaceted foreign strategy, in which renewable initiatives represent one of the BRI’s developing green standards for investment projects. Moreover, China’s already well-developed domestic renewable sector allows for a more affordable supply of components needed for green projects in Central Asia.

China has managed to surpass Russia as a main trading partner in the region and has become the top trade partner of all five Central Asian countries. In 2024, the total volume of trade between the Central Asian region and China reached $95 billion, with Kazakhstan as the biggest economic partner at around $43.8 billion.

Increased trade requires significant investments in transportation infrastructure, which China has been doing across Central Asia, as part of its BRI strategy. Land transportation routes through Central Asia offer China an alternative to sea routes, reducing its dependency on them and boosting trade with countries in the region and with Europe.

For Sino-Central Asian trade to continue thriving, regional security needs to be maintained. China's focus on Central Asia has a substantial security undertone, as maintaining regional stability is important for protecting its economic interests, such as trade routes and energy supplies. China-Central Asia security relationship is based on mutual efforts to prevent the "three forces" of terrorism, separatism and extremism, with China especially being concentrated on preventing potential destabilizing threats in its western Xinjiang region, which borders Central Asia.

EU’s goals in Central Asia

Due to recent geopolitical shifts caused by the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, the EU's interest in Central Asia has rapidly grown, especially in the fields of energy security, diversified transportation routes and rare minerals mining. The EU’s desire to concurrently reduce dependency on Russian energy and trade routes, and to intensify domestic green transition, has made new transportation corridors through Central Asia and the region’s mineral and raw materials wealth very attractive to the EU.

In 2025, the EU and Central Asian countries held the first European Union-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, focusing on four main areas of cooperation: transport, raw materials, clean energy and digital connectivity. This summit only confirms that the EU views Central Asia as an important region for its energy and economic security, and for advancing European strategic priorities. The summit also served as a platform for the EU’s announcement of an additional €12 billion investment package for Central Asia under its Global Gateway initiative, with €3 billion allocated to transport, €2.5 billion to critical raw materials, €6.4 billion to water, energy, and climate, and the remaining funds intended for digital connectivity.

These investments are taking place amid the new U.S. President Donald Trump’s global trade tariffs, which have also affected several EU countries; ongoing tensions with Russia over its aggression against Ukraine; and Europe’s efforts to mitigate China’s increasing presence and influence in the region. These elements may also be interpreted as factors behind the EU’s renewed engagement in Central Asia.

In terms of transportation and connectivity, the EU sees the Middle Corridor as a new, reliable transport route that has the potential to reduce its dependence on the Russian Northern Corridor. Moreover, this route enables the EU to connect to China through Central Asia and the South Caucasus, providing strong regional connectivity and economic benefits from intensified and faster trade.

Better connectivity with the Middle Corridor helps Europe obtain the necessary energy resources and raw materials essential to its green projects. For instance, Kazakhstan has used this route to export uranium and oil to Europe, circumventing Russian territory. 

China-EU power dynamics as competitive cooperation

China and the EU are both partners and competitors in Central Asia. They share the same interests in maintaining regional security and supporting a stable, economically developed and connected Central Asia. For China and the EU, instability in Central Asia can endanger their economic investments and energy supplies, and this drives both to pay attention to the regional threats of political instability, terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking.

Although their approaches to resolving potential and real threats differ, China emphasizes hard security and state-to-state cooperation, using border controls, military exercises and working through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on counter-terrorism and security measures to protect its infrastructure and economic projects. The EU relies on governance, rule of law, and supporting judicial reform, anti-corruption programs, and civil society initiatives to help Central Asian countries tackle the root causes of instability.

Investing in infrastructure and connectivity in Central Asia remains a priority for both China and the EU. China’s BRI and the EU’s Global Gateway initiative have invested greatly in railways, roads, and digital infrastructure across Central Asia to intensify trade and regional integration. However, the BRI pushes for rapid, large-scale and debt-fueled infrastructure, while Global Gateway supports more sustainable and rules-based connectivity. This dichotomy creates points of friction and competition between China and Europe in the region.

Energy and natural resources are another field of simultaneous cooperation and competitiveness between China and the EU in Central Asia. This region, rich in oil, gas and various critical raw minerals, can help the EU diversify its energy supply channels and advance its green transition, and help China meet its growing domestic energy and industrial demands. Although both need and support stable energy supply routes, they also compete for access to critical raw materials such as lithium, copper, and uranium, which have become highly demanded due to the expansion of green energy and modern technologies in industry.

Both China and the EU actively participate in regional dialogues and forums that promote economic growth, trade integration, and connectivity, all of which support a stable and prosperous Central Asia. However, their differing foreign policy approaches and models of influence create tensions and competitive behavior. While this competition never escalates into open rivalry, it nevertheless limits the potential for deeper cooperation and mutual understanding in the region.

The role of multi-vector strategy in China-EU regional power dynamics

Central Asian countries have started actively pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, especially following the significant geopolitical shifts after the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022. This foreign policy approach allows smaller but strategically positioned states to concurrently maintain meaningful diplomatic ties with global and regional powers and leverage them to maximize their national interests and gain benefits in various sectors, including economic, security, cultural and technological.

Employing a multi-vector strategy, Central Asian countries can balance relations with major powers such as Russia, China, the U.S., and the EU, and maximize strategic autonomy, receive economic benefits, and maintain sovereignty through these diversified partnerships. Although such a strategy is not without limitations, it has provided the Central Asian region with leverage to participate in global political and economic relations and trends.

Major geopolitical shifts, emerging trends in industrial and technological development, and the proactive foreign policies of Central Asian countries continue shaping China-EU power dynamics in the region. Cooperative competence remains a modus vivendi in Sino-European relations in Central Asia, reflecting the complex coexistence and collaboration of these major global actors in this strategically important region.

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