What is driving the new wave of military takeovers in Africa?

The AnewZ Opinion section provides a platform for independent voices to share expert perspectives on global and regional issues. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official position of AnewZ

Military coups have reappeared across West Africa and the Sahel. Recent events in Guinea-Bissau and coup attempt in Benin add to a growing list of abrupt power shifts over the past five years.

These are not isolated crises, but signs of a wider regional pattern driven by institutional fragility, unresolved colonial legacies, public frustration, and a shifting geopolitical landscape. Understanding these structural forces is key to explaining why coups now spread from one country to another. In this piece, we examine this trend.

The resurgence of military coups across West Africa and the Sahel has become one of the defining political trends of the early 2020s. It marks a sharp break from the democratic optimism of earlier decades. The recent military takeover in Guinea-Bissau and the coup attempt in Benin soon after show how quickly this wave is spreading and how deeply it is rooted. Although each country faces its own conflicts, but  the rise in coups reflects a shared structural crisis. Weak political institutions, contested elections, entrenched corruption, economic stagnation, and unresolved colonial-era governance patterns create conditions in which militaries present themselves as the only force capable of restoring order. At the same time, shifting geopolitical dynamics especially declining Western influence and Russia’s expanding presence offer new incentives and external reassurance to military actors considering a power grab. What appears to be spontaneous domestic unrest is, in reality, a multilayered regional phenomenon shaped by historical, political, and geopolitical forces.

Failure of institutions

The primary and most immediate common driver of recent coups is institutional fragility. In many West African states, the framework of constitutional democracy hasr emained more procedural than substantive. Elections occur regularly, but independent election commissions, rule-of-law protections, and equitable access to political competition are often compromised. This fragility transforms political disputes into existential confrontations, where losing power can mean losing access to resources, security, and personal safety. In such conditions, militaries frequently position themselves as neutral guardians capable of restoring order. The coup in Guinea-Bissau in December 2025 followed this very script. After both the incumbent government and the opposition prematurely declared victory in a disputed election, the armed forces intervened, claiming that political actors had undermined national stability. Although these justifications are rarely credible, they resonate with populations accustomed to institutional dysfunction and fragmented political elites.

Beyond electoral disputes, a deeper structural weakness lies in the limited reach and capacity of state institutions. Post-colonial state formation in West Africa often produced administrative systems that were both over-centralized and underdeveloped, functioning effectively only in capital cities while failing to build resilient bureaucratic structures at local levels. This institutional thinness has made states highly vulnerable to internal shocks. In countries like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, the inability to provide security in peripheral regions, where jihadist insurgencies and criminal networks operate freely has eroded public confidence. When civilian governments repeatedly fail to deliver basic governance, militaries gain political legitimacy simply by presenting themselves as more decisive than elected officials. Even in more stable states such as Benin, the perception that institutions are losing their capacity to manage political conflict has emboldened factions within the security sector to test the limits of loyalty and obedience.

Colonial legacies and the “domino effect” of regime collapse

The second major driver is the set of historical legacies inherited from colonial rule. Many of the political pathologies that produce coups today are rooted in the institutional patterns established during French and Portuguese colonial administration. Colonial governance relied heavily on centralized authority, military coercion, and indirect rule through local intermediaries. This legacy left behind militaries that were often more coherent and disciplined than civilian institutions, granting them disproportionate political weight after independence. The persistence of patronage networks, authoritarian governing styles, and resource extraction economies further entrenched these early structures. It is not an accident that many of the countries experiencing coups have borders drawn arbitrarily during the colonial era, bringing together diverse ethnic and regional communities under administrative systems not designed to manage inclusiveness or democratic participation. As a result, the modern state continues to carry the contradictions of its historical formation, and these unresolved tensions create fertile ground for military intervention.

Alongside institutional fragility and colonial legacies, the “domino effect” has become a defining feature of the coup resurgence. One of the most striking observations from the past five years is the sequential pattern of military takeovers. Mali’s coups in 2020 and 2021 were followed by Burkina Faso in 2022, Guinea in 2022, Niger in 2023, and then the events of 2025 in Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau. The attempted coup in Benin, although unsuccessful, fits this pattern. The logic is straightforward: when a neighboring country successfully installs a junta and suffers few meaningful consequences, military factions elsewhere interpret this as a signal that seizing power is both feasible and potentially rewarded. Regional organizations such as ECOWAS have attempted to respond, but their credibility has weakened, especially after sanctions on juntas in Mali and Niger failed to produce quick transitions back to civilian rule. The erosion of deterrence means that each new coup lowers the threshold for the next.

Geopolitical realignment: waning West, rising Russia

Geopolitics amplifies these tendencies. Over the past decade, the influence of Western powers, particularly France, which historically maintained strong security presence in the Sahel has diminished significantly. Anti-French sentiment has grown across the region, driven partly by frustration with the limited effectiveness of Western backed counterterrorism missions and partly by a broader narrative that associates France with continued neo-colonial control. Civilian governments, struggling to address insecurity, have often depended heavily on Western military support, which in turn made them vulnerable to anti-Western political rhetoric. Coups have capitalized on this sentiment by promising a more sovereign foreign policy and by distancing themselves from former colonial powers.

In contrast, Russia has strategically expanded its influence by positioning itself as an alternative security partner. The model established through the Wagner Group now restructured under Russia’s state-controlled Africa Corps, combines military support, political consulting, resource agreements, and information operations. For juntas facing internal insecurity or international isolation, Russia’s non-conditional partnerships appear attractive. In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, pro-Russian sentiment has become a visible component of political messaging, with demonstrations frequently displaying Russian flags and denouncing Western involvement. Although Russia does not explicitly orchestrate coups, its willingness to support military governments after they occur alters the strategic environment in which those coups are conceived. For officers contemplating power seizures, the existence of a geopolitical patron reduces the risks traditionally associated with international condemnation.

The economies of many affected states further exacerbate political instability. High youth unemployment, inflation, declining commodity prices, and climate-induced crises particularly in agriculture have generated widespread public frustration. In such environments, promises of swift reform under military rule become appealing to marginalized populations who see little improvement under civilian administrations. However, juntas rarely deliver meaningful economic transformation. Instead, they often centralize resource control, weaken transparency, and deepen long-term dependency on external actors, reinforcing a cycle that eventually generates new grievances. The political volatility created by this cycle not only legitimizes future coups but also undermines regional economic integration and security cooperation.

The cases of Guinea-Bissau and Benin illustrate how this convergence of factors manifests differently depending on national context but follows a similar underlying logic. Guinea-Bissau’s coup occurred in a system known for chronic instability, drug trafficking networks, factionalism within the military, and weak civilian control. The disputed election served as a trigger rather than a cause; the deeper issue was a political system unable to manage competition without external mediation or coercive intervention. Benin, by contrast, has historically been regarded as one of West Africa’s more stable democracies. The recent attempt did not result in regime change, but its very occurrence signals how far the coup contagion has spread. Even states with stronger institutions are not insulated when regional dynamics shift and when militaries test the boundaries of political power.

Looking ahead, the regional implications are profound. The Sahel and West Africa are entering a period in which political transitions are increasingly unpredictable, and civilian governments face mounting pressure to demonstrate both competence and legitimacy. Without robust reforms aimed at strengthening rule-of-law institutions, creating inclusive political systems, and ensuring that security forces operate under effective civilian oversight, the likelihood of further coups remains high. Regional organizations must reform their approaches as well, moving beyond reactive sanctions and instead building long-term mechanisms for conflict prevention, election credibility, and democratic consolidation. Finally, the geopolitical realignment underway suggests that the region’s strategic landscape will continue to evolve as local actors navigate between Western and Russian influence a dynamic that will shape not only governance structures but also security outcomes for years to come.

The resurgence of coups in West Africa and the Sahel is therefore not merely a temporary disruption but a symptom of structural transformations that have been unfolding for decades. Understanding these deeper forces is essential for developing policies that can stabilize the region, strengthen institutions, and prevent the normalization of military rule. The recent wave of coups in Africa highlights deeper structural failures, including weak institutions, contested legitimacy, and shifting global influence. Unless states strengthen governance and regional bodies establish credible safeguards, military takeovers will continue to be a recurring feature of West African politics. Achieving sustainable stability requires long-term institutional reform.

Copied