Trump’s peace plan: A fig leaf for Putin

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Peace in Ukraine seems to be closer than ever. U.S. President Donald Trump’s 28-point peace proposal could pave the way for an end to the hostilities – or at least a temporary freeze – in the Eastern European nation.

But who would benefit the most if Kyiv and Moscow were to reach a deal in the coming weeks?

Ever since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there were several attempts to end the conflict. Although the Istanbul Communiqué was far more favorable for Kyiv in many segments than Trump’s initiative, in the spring of 2022 Ukraine was not willing to reach an agreement with Russia. More than three years later, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is reportedly facing Washington’s ultimatum to accept the US leader’s proposal.

For Zelenskyy, point 25 is the most problematic, as it stipulates that Ukraine would hold elections 100 days after the agreement is signed. Given that Trump’s peace initiative implies that Ukrainian forces would withdraw from the part of Donetsk oblast they currently control, there is no doubt that accepting this proposal would be seen as capitulation to Russia by large parts of Ukrainian society. As a result, Zelenskyy would almost certainly lose the election.

Given that Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly stated that he does not recognize the former actor as a legitimate Ukrainian leader, he would likely welcome such an outcome. That, however, does not mean that Zelenskyy would be replaced by a pro-Russian figure. Whoever comes to power in Kyiv would undoubtedly seek to restore Ukrainian sovereignty over the territories held by Russia. Thus, even without Zelenskyy in office, Ukraine is expected to prepare for another round of inevitable confrontation.

Kyiv, however, fears that guarantees that the United States would provide to Ukraine are not sufficient to prevent a Russian reinvasion. More importantly, it is highly questionable whether the Ukrainian political leadership can accept “point 7”, which states that “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO.” Fully aware of Kyiv’s ambitions to eventually join the US-led alliance, European powers are expected in the coming days to work on improving Trump’s document, aiming to make it as favorable to Ukraine as possible. If they succeed, it remains unclear whether the updated version of the peace proposal would be acceptable to Moscow.

By accepting Trump’s initial initiative, Putin would give the Ukrainian Armed Forces enough time to consolidate, regroup, rearm, and launch an offensive to recapture the Donbass, significant parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and potentially even Crimea. Although the document was formulated in a way that allows the Kremlin to present it to the Russian audience as “victory”, claiming that all of its demands were fulfilled, in reality Trump’s proposal is not nearly as beneficial for Moscow as it may seem at first glance.

For instance, according to Trump’s proposal, Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized de facto as Russian, including by the United States. Those regions, as well as significant parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, are already de facto Russian. Without de jure recognition, any Ukrainian attempt to recapture those territories would not be considered an invasion of Russia. This detail is crucial, as point 10 states that “if Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the US security guarantee.” Given that no country in the world will de jure recognize Russian annexation of the Ukrainian territory, Kyiv would retain the legal right to conduct military operations there without jeopardizing its US security guarantees.

Moreover, Trump demands that Russia withdraw its forces from parts of Kharkiv, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, while Ukraine, in exchange, would be required to relinquish the areas of the Donbas it still controls. As a result, the cities of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka would formally be Russian, although Moscow would have no right to station troops there.

Under the current dynamics of the war, Russia would capture the entire Donbas sooner rather than later. Thus, a Ukrainian withdrawal from the region is unlikely to be interpreted as a concession to Moscow. Still, for the Ukrainian public, such a gesture would undoubtedly be labeled as “capitulation”, as would the limitation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to 600,000 personnel – point six of Trump’s peace plan. That is why no politician in Kyiv would be willing to sign the agreement that includes these clauses.

Although the Kremlin, despite its harsh rhetoric, appears intent on ending the conflict in a way that allows Putin to save face, it is not certain that Moscow could agree to pay Ukraine de facto war reparations from the frozen Russian assets in the West – point 14 of Trump’s initiative. Also, the document does not specify exactly when the West will lift sanctions it imposed on Russia, which is of key importance to the Russian elite.

When Putin launched the invasion of Ukraine, one of his goals was for Kyiv to grant the Russian language equal status with Ukrainian. Trump’s plan suggests that Ukraine will adopt “EU rules on religious tolerance and protection of linguistic minorities,” but that does not mean Russian would receive the same official recognition as Ukrainian. By accepting this point, Putin would give up on one of the official goals of his so-called special military operation in Ukraine.

In theory, the Kremlin could portray point 20, “All Nazi ideology and activity must be rejected and prohibited”, as the achievement of its “denazification of Ukraine” agenda. However, Ukrainian laws already prohibit Nazi ideology. To “denazify” the Eastern European country in the way that pro-Kremlin propaganda insists, Russia would need to establish full occupation of Ukraine, which is far from realistic.

Finally, even though some points of Trump’s plan are unacceptable to Kyiv, the document essentially serves as a fig leaf for Putin, helping him present Russia’s debacle in Ukraine as a “victory.” By reaching peace with Kyiv under Trump’s conditions, the Russian leader would agree to halt hostilities without achieving any of his strategic goals, allowing the American president to potentially receive the long-awaited Nobel Peace Prize.

The bigger problem, however, is that another round of confrontation can erupt as soon as Trump leaves the White House – if not earlier – as the document states that its implementation would be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council headed by President Trump.

Thus, if Moscow and Kyiv agree to Trump’s proposal, it would likely only freeze the war in Ukraine, rather than end it. Given that the core issues would remain unresolved, it could pave the way for an even bloodier conflict in the future. 

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